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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This thesis strives to shed light on the genuine significance of the current 
transformation of the U.S. foreign and strategic policy.  
In essence, this thesis concludes that the Bush doctrine of preemption is 
inconsistent with the American strategic culture and view of the use of force displayed 
throughout the American foreign policy ever since the Truman administration. Although 
not a revolution per se in the American goals, the new foreign policy represents a radical 
change in the manner to pursue them. While promoting a unilateralist foreign policy and 
revived “war-fighting” strategies, the current administration takes old rationales a step 
further. By elevating preemption from the tactical to strategic level, the doctrine 
transforms a last resort policy option into a primary offensive strategy with destabilizing 
consequences for international relations. 
The analysis concludes that the increased authority of the hard-line approach in 
the American foreign and security policy is circumstantial, and the likelihood of its 
endurance is unrealistic. The international system comprises built-in constraints that raise 
the cost of isolationist and unilateralist impulses to unbearable levels in the long term. 
These constraints are the end result of the American national values’ projection at 
international level.  
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The ardent debate preceding the 2003 U.S.-led intervention in Iraq generated a 
crisis situation, with predictions of a gloomy future for the trans-Atlantic partnership. In 
light of the diverging positions on the policy toward Iraq, some scholars emphasized that, 
despite common agreement on the general values, a gap is widening between Europeans 
and Americans in terms of the ranking threat perceptions and preferred method of coping 
with them. They perceived the elevation of the preemption doctrine to the status of 
primary policy option as a departure from the traditional U.S. strategic culture, with 
destabilizing effect for the international security environment.1  
Indeed, although the concepts of a preventive and preemptive attack were rooted 
in traditional military patterns of thinking, twentieth century strategic considerations, as 
well as earlier developments in the field of international law, imposed restrictions on the 
use of force and standards of acceptable behavior in inter-state relations. Thus, in view of 
remarkable efforts made by the American administrations throughout the last half of 
century to uphold a stable international environment through institutions, the spread of 
democracy and rule of law, the new stance in the American foreign policy was 
considered a radical transformation. Furthermore, the Bush doctrine seems even more 
puzzling in light of the American view of the use of force illustrated by President Truman 
- “We do not believe in aggressive or preventive war. Such war is the weapon of 
dictators, not of free democratic societies.”2 
Nonetheless, today, American officials stress that the current setting of the 
security environment is characterized by a “crossroad of radicalism and technology,” 
requiring decisive action, as President Bush June pointed out during his 2002 West Point 
address.3 The complexity of the new security challenges was revealed by other officials 
                                                 
1 2002 US National Security Strategy, (http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html, consulted on 11 
January 2004) 
2 Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, American National Security, Fifth 
edition, Baltimore and London, The John Hopkins University Press, 1999, p. 57. 
3 President George W. Bush, Remarks at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military 
Academy West Point, New York, (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html, 
consulted on 3 June 2004) 
2 
as well, stating that as “rogue states, religious extremism and international terrorism … 
become inextricably linked … [feeding] off the other, the sum of evil is even greater than 
that of the individual parts.”4 Consequently, the Bush administration argued that the 
American national security strategy has to be adapted to the enemy’s “determination to 
obtain destructive powers … and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of 
mass destruction.”5 
In light of the aforementioned debate about trans-Atlantic rift and criticism of 
U.S. foreign policy, this thesis strives to shed light on the genuine significance of the 
current development of the U.S. foreign and strategic policy. It will do so by observing 
the manner in which preemption policy has been mirrored in the U.S. strategic culture. 
For this purpose, the thesis examines the U.S. national security policy, with special 
attention to preemption and preventive war. In addition, the analysis employs the 
framework offered by international norms of the use of force. The objective is to use the 
international norms designed and endorsed by the United States along the last half of 
century as a point of reference for the national values traditionally promoted by the 
United States.  
The findings build the foundation for a better understanding of the rationale 
behind the recent evolutions of the U.S. foreign policy and the magnitude of 
transformations. The overarching goal of this thesis is to determine if the new doctrine is 
a predominant longstanding American preference or a radical transformation. Moreover, 
the focus on U.S. strategic culture provides useful device to evaluate the likelihood of 
Bush doctrine’s longevity.  
In sum, the analysis reveals the American view of the use of force. In light of the 
United States’ position as the most powerful state in the international system, the results 
bear great significance suggesting manners in which the American power might be 
employed in the future. 
                                                 
4 Margaret Thatcher, Statecraft - Strategies for a Changing World, United Kingdom, HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2002, p. 207. 
5 2002 US National Security Strategy, (http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html , consulted on 11 
January 2004) 
3 
In essence, this thesis concludes that the Bush doctrine of preemption is 
inconsistent with the American strategic culture and view of the use of force displayed 
throughout the American foreign policy ever since the Truman administration. Although 
not a revolution per se in the American goals, the new foreign policy represents a radical 
change in the manner to pursue them.6 
For the most part, throughout the Cold War the U.S. declaratory policy followed a 
cyclical line between opposing doctrines, alternating between bolder and more lenient 
postures. The shift was determined by strategic considerations, technological progress 
and personal beliefs of the political and military leadership. However, despite the 
fluctuation in the American national security policy, an overall multilateral orientation 
has been an element of continuity in the American strategic culture throughout the 
modern history.  
As opposed to previous policies, the Bush doctrine of preemption represents a 
sharp break with the American strategic culture. While promoting a unilateralist foreign 
policy and revived “war-fighting” strategies, the current administration takes old 
rationales a step further.7 In other words, by elevating preemption from tactical to 
strategic level, the doctrine transforms for the first time in the history of the United States 
a mostly last resort policy option into a primary offensive strategy.  
Internationally the Bush doctrine has generated great concern. One reason is that 
it is widely seen to be at odds with provisions for anticipatory self-defense. Furthermore, 
as defined in the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, the Bush doctrine of preemption 
resembles the argument of preventive action. In addition, the United States’ attempt to 
implement the new doctrine in the case of Iraq was considered by some UN members in 
violation of key norms of international law – i.e., sovereignty, state responsibility and 
non-intervention.8 
                                                 
6 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, 
Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 2003, p. 40. 
7 Miriam Sapiro, “Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense,” The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 97, No. 3, July 2003, p. 599. 
8 Michael J. Glennon, “Why the Security Council Failed,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2003, p. 2. 
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Ultimately, this thesis concludes that the increased authority of the hard-line 
approach in the American foreign and security policy is circumstantial, and the likelihood 
of a lasting influence of the Bush doctrine of preemption is unrealistic. It is particularly 
the United States’ success over the last half of century in transferring national values at 
the international level aiming to shape a new pattern of interaction in the international 
relations that places constraints on the American behavior. In today’s globalized era, 
where the threats acquired a trans-national character, unilateral conduct faces constraints 
posed by the achievement of the binding relations envisaged more than a half of century 
ago by the Western democracies under substantial American influence. The impossibility 
to tackle the challenges to the security environment in isolation, transforms cooperation 
in a mandatory component for success.  
To arrive at these findings, the thesis employs the framework of analysis offered 
by the literature on strategic culture.9 It examines the enduring trends as well as 
discontinuities in threat perceptions, strategic preferences, and choices made by the 
American elites in order to cope with the challenges presented by the international 
security. 
The utility of the strategic culture approach is offered by its focus on analyzing 
the particularities of each nation in “adapting to the environment and solving problems 
with respect to the threat or use of force.”10 This complements the study of international 
relations by emphasizing the notion of national identity and the importance of culture in 
the process of identity formation. By recognizing national particularities, the added value 
of the strategic culture approach rests on the creation of a comprehensive view of 
perceptions and distinct model of reasoning. In statecraft, the strategic culture insight  
                                                 
9 Jack Snyder was among the first to coin the term of “strategic culture,” in 1977, in a study of the 
Soviet military strategy. His analysis of the Soviet nuclear strategy through the framework offered by 
strategic culture was critical insight in the context of deterrence doctrine, which guided the American 
strategy at the time. The influence that Snyder’s breakthrough had on strategic studies scholarship has been 
illustrated by subsequent publications: Strategy and Ethnocentrism, by Ken Booth; Nuclear Strategy and 
National Style, by Colin Gray. 
10 Ken Booth, “The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed,” in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed., Strategic 
Power: USA/USSR, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1990, p. 121. 
5 
provides a critical foundation for a comprehensive policy and communication strategy. It 
does so by complementing the narrow focus of the neorealist structural approach on a 
rational state-actor model centered on abstraction and rationality.11  
Hence, this thesis considers the influence of historically-rooted experiences in 
shaping U.S. perceptions with regard to security environment and provides details about 
the causal relations that fed the process of ranking preferred methods to efficiently cope 
with a perceived threat. While, the strategic culture account is one of the multiple 
causation explanations that lead to a decision, its utility rests on the insight provided with 
regards to national particularities embedded in enduring perceptions, patterns of 
reasoning and preferred behavior to cope with the perceived threat.12  
A. STRATEGIC CULTURE FRAMEWORK  
The study of strategic culture gained increased relevance in early 1990s. The 
incentive was generated by the inability of the mainstream schools of thought in the 
international relations field to predict or explain the end of the Cold War.13 The main 
goal was to achieve a more comprehensive analysis by examining dimensions formerly 
clouded by the rationalist model propagated during the Cold War.14 
The new strategic circumstances as well as the transformed nature of the 
international relations prompted scholars’ determination to extend the knowledge about 
inter-state relations, by including a “sociological perspective on the politics of national 
security.”15 Hence, building on Richard Ullman’s earlier call for “broadening … the 
                                                 
11 Ken Booth, “The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed,” p. 122. 
12 Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, Lanham, Md., Hamilton Press/Abt. Books, 
1986, p. 38. 
13 Peter Katzenstein, “Preface,” The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics, New York, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, Columbia University Press, 1996, p. XI. 
14 Among the new scholars of strategic culture, Stephen Peter Rosen examines the influence of the 
nature of the society in determining the military power generated by different nations, in order to identify 
the rationale for distinct military capabilities held by different cultures. For a detailed discussion see 
Stephen Peter Rosen, “Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 
4, Spring 1995. 
Similarly, Elizabeth Kier analyzes the driving factor in the process of decision making with 
regards to the type of military doctrine a state adopts, from an organizational cultural perspective. For a 
detailed discussion see Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars,” 
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring 1995. 
15 Peter Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security, “The Culture of 
National Security, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, p. 2. 
6 
concept of security” beyond the material capabilities and military force, far-reaching 
perspectives were advocated, to predict national preferences for future security 
strategies.16 
As a result, the concepts of power and wealth, as objects of analysis of the salient 
schools of thought, were supplemented by the socio-cultural factors of the institutional 
context. The goal was to acknowledge the influence of states’ “constructed identity” to 
the national security, particularly with regards to the process of decision-making.17 
Hence, the analysis compelled sociological use of concepts like collective norms, identity 
and culture in an effort to enlighten their constitutive and regulative effect on preferences 
of national security policy.18  
By identifying the sources of national interest and strategic preferences formation, 
the insight offered by the strategic culture was viewed particularly helpful for the post-
Cold War efforts to design the new world order, as noted by John Ikenberry:  
the character and stability of postwar order hinge on the capacities of 
states to develop institutional mechanisms to restrain power and establish 
binding commitments – capacities that stem from the political character of 
states and prevailing strategic thinking about the sources of international 
order.19 
Overall, Alastair Iain Johnston has been the scholar of strategic culture that made 
the most impressive intellectual effort to further the concept. Endorsing previous 
definitions of strategic culture, he emphasizes that national particularities with regards to 
predominant strategic preferences are rooted in the formative experiences of the state, 
and influenced by “the philosophical, political, cultural, and cognitive characteristics of 
the state and its elites.20  
                                                 
16 Peter Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security, “The Culture of 
National Security, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, p. 8. 
17 Peter Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security, “The Culture of 
National Security, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, pp. 4-28. 
18 Peter Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security, “The Culture of 
National Security, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, p. 5. 
19 John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding or Order After 
Major Wars, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 10. 
20 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4, 
Spring 1995, p. 34. 
7 
He argues that each state’s rationality is defined and consistent with its strategic 
culture, as formative experiences define the manner of ranking preferences and methods 
to cope with particular situations. In short, the strategic culture generates a set of lenses 
through which the reality is viewed:  
Strategic culture is an integrated <system of symbols (e.g., argumentation 
structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish 
pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts 
of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and 
by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the 
strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.21 
Johnston’s analysis of strategic culture centers on fundamental assumptions of a 
nation about the strategic environment:  
the role of war in human affairs (whether it is inevitable or an aberration), 
about the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses (zero-sum or 
variable sum), and about the efficacy of the use of force (about the ability 
to control outcomes and to eliminate threats, and the conditions under 
which applied force is useful).22 
In his opinion, the particular worldview defined by the strategic culture results in 
specific strategic options viewed as retaining a higher degree of efficiency in dealing with 
the threat environment, in particular a “ranked set of grand strategic preferences that are 
consistent across the objects of analysis and persistent across time.23  
For the purpose of this thesis, the conception of strategic culture developed by 
Alastair Johnston is used in a customized form. The analysis accounts for the American 
elites’ debates about the U.S.’s role in the international system and preferred methods to 
cope with the perceived threat.24 To achieve that, the thesis examines the U.S. National 
Security Strategy and the evolution of the military doctrine throughout the Cold War and 
post-Cold War era.  
                                                 
21 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” p. 46. 
22 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” p. 46. 
23Alastair Iain Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” The Culture of National 
Security, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, p. 223. 
24 Amos A. Jordan et al., American National Security, p. 46. 
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The focus will be on the threat perceptions, the view of the role of war, and 
efficacy of the use of force embedded in the American strategic culture. Special 
consideration is given to the manner in which the concepts of preventive and preemptive 
action are perceived. 
Hence, at the outset, chapter II sets the scene by portraying the initial American 
strategic culture. Competing worldviews and values with regards to the use of force are 
discussed. The purpose is to lay the foundation for a thorough understanding of the 
American strategic culture, and offer the needed background to grasp the process of 
rationalization behind the foreign and national security policy formulation.  
As the systemic management mechanism envisaged at the end of the World War 
II were greatly influenced by the American values and norms, the analysis continues by 
offering an overview of international law provisions regarding the legitimate use of force 
in self-defense. The goal is to set the scene for a better perspective of the significance of 
current transformations, by using both national and international norms and values as 
point of reference throughout the analysis. 
Subsequently, Chapters III and IV examine the evolution of the U.S. military 
strategy in the Cold War and post-Cold War era and the worldview that shaped it. In 
other words, these chapters present a historical synopsis of United States policy 
preferences in national security. The continuation of trends and major alterations in the 
American national security policy are accounted for, as well as the driving factors that 
determined them. In doing so, the analysis reveals the process of formation of enduring 
patterns with regards to perceptions of threat and predominant strategic preferences of 
behavior adopted to cope with it. An historical overview of preemption in the U.S. 
strategic policy concludes each of the two chapters. 
Next, the thesis concludes by analyzing the Bush doctrine of preemption through 
the lenses offered by previous chapters – i.e., the American strategic culture and practice, 
as well as international law provisions with the goal to identify the significance of the 
Bush doctrine of preemption for the American strategic culture and prospects of its 
durability. 
 
9 
II. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS OF USE OF 
FORCE  
A.  TRADITIONAL AMERICAN VIEW OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
USE OF FORCE 
According to scholars of strategic culture, the initial American perception of 
security was shaped by its geographic position. The relative geographical isolation and 
the absence of an immediate external threat generated among Americans a perception of 
physical security, directing the focus toward domestic issues, consolidation of the 
hemispheric interest and continental expansion.25 Several other factors contributed to 
reinforce this interpretation. Primarily, it was the heritage of Enlightenment philosophy, 
particularly of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s writings and John Locke’s natural rights 
doctrine, which viewed the state of nature as a condition of “peace, mutual assistance, 
and preservation.”26 This led to a utopian view of the world, reinforced by the Judeo-
Christian gospel, which added a feature of morality as essential value of the American 
identity as well as a sense of mission as national responsibility.27 Equally important, the 
absence of great powers war that followed the Congress of Vienna (1815) defined the 
initial American perception of normalcy as lacking outside intrusion and primacy of 
domestic affairs.28 Thus, in light of this perception of normalcy, the issues related to 
security and foreign affairs were neglected by the American strategic culture in favor of 
domestic affairs.29  
By and large, even at the beginning of the twentieth century, the mainstream 
American view of foreign policy was defined by isolationist tendencies, best illustrated 
by President George Washington’s advice to the American people in the farewell address 
(1796): 
                                                 
25 Amos A. Jordan et al., American National Security, p. 52. 
26 Amos A. Jordan et al., American National Security, p. 54. 
27 Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, Stephen J. Cimbala, U.S. National Security Policymakers, 
Processes, and Politics, Third Edition, Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, p. 8. 
28 The Congress of Vienna introduced one of the longest periods of European peace, precluding wars 
among the Great European Powers for forty years, and no general war for another sixty years. 
29 Amos A. Jordan et al., American National Security, pp. 52- 60. 
10 
The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending 
our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection 
as possible… Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate 
ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of … [Europe’s] 
politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or 
enmities.30 
Overall, America was better off without the burden of the European history, 
contaminated with the virus of rivalry and violence, leading to self-destruction. It was the 
European immoral imperialistic conquest, which prompted Americans to consider 
European powers corrupted and decadent. This was in part the result of the American 
view of war. 
Considered a pathological aberration, war was rejected by Americans as tool of 
statecraft, in disagreement with von Clausewitz’s dictum that war is an extension of 
politics. Moreover, if conflict was imminent, the war had to pursue a just cause. The goal 
had to be to restore the state of normalcy, represented by peaceful relations – i.e., to end 
all wars.31 Hence, the American strategic culture portrayed war as a last resort tool, 
employed for moral principles.  
The ethical approach of the American strategic culture contributed in shaping not 
only the reasoning for going to war, but also the manner in which war was to be fought. 
That is to say that war was seen legitimate when “fought either in self-defense or in 
collective defense against an armed attack.”32  Furthermore, the strong belief in “just 
war” and the important role played by religion added a crusading spirit to the American 
way of war. This particularity acted at times as a powerful catalyst for violence, pushing 
for prompt response - i.e., American involvement in a war had to be swift and efficient.  
Overall, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the American strategic culture 
was defined by clear distinction between the instruments of peace and those of war. This 
shaped rigid positions, limiting the range of preferences in the American process of 
assessment to extreme options: e.g., good versus evil. The evil had to be eradicated in a 
                                                 
30 President George Washington farewell address, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School 
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prompt manner, reflecting clear and final decisions, as the American expectations in a 
war were marked by impatience and tendency to claim total victory, or unconditioned 
surrender.33  
B.  COMPETING VISIONS OF SECURITY  
Nonetheless, notwithstanding the traditional isolationist stance of the American 
strategic culture, the lessons learned from the two World Wars taught the American 
political leadership that leaving fundamental decisions to others bore a high cost. This 
implied that the United States could not insulate itself from the rest of the world. The 
goal was to export/spread the American national values and sense of normalcy in order to 
preclude another World War. 
Thus, according to their post-World War II leadership role in the international 
system the American elites assumed the responsibility to actively participate in designing 
“rules and principles of international relations” for the new world order.34 It follows that 
the foreign policy questions facing the American leadership were essentially addressing 
the challenge of defining the United States’ national interest and the means to pursue it.  
Despite of isolationists’ disgrace, the debate about the American foreign policy 
continued, disputing the arguments for U.S. international role advanced by two different 
schools of thought: multilateralists and unilateralists. They were divided by 
disagreements about the manner in which the American interest should be pursued. The 
former advocated international organizations, military alliances and advance of the rule 
of law as the key instruments of foreign policy. Conversely, the unilateralists favored an 
assertive foreign policy, lacking entanglement, especially in situations where the 
American vital interest was not involved. They accepted the international organizations 
and alliances only conditioned by the American dominance over them.35   
As the interwar experience illustrated that, favored by political leaders, unfettered 
unilateralism contributes to isolationist outcome, the Truman administration opted for a 
foreign policy that followed Woodrow Wilson’s goals in a fashion informed by the 
realities of power politics. The new American view of foreign policy relied on 
                                                 
33 Amos A. Jordan et al., American National Security, p. 59. 
34 John Ikenberry, After Victory, p. 3. 
35 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound, pp. 9-11. 
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multilateral approach, consisting of a just blend of power and cooperation. Hence, 
President Truman carried on President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s concept for pursuit 
of universal security in concert of power, which reconciled Presidents Woodrow 
Wilson’s liberal internationalist view with President Theodore Roosevelt’s vision of 
concert of power. Despite grievance from hard-line conservatives favoring unilateralist 
view, the Truman administration succeeded to consolidate consensus pertaining to 
American foreign policy.36 President Truman’s visionary leadership synthesized and 
reconciled diverging trends in the public debate for an active participation of the United 
States in a system founded on principles of multilateral relations.37  
C. SHIFTING THE TRADITIONAL AMERICAN STRATEGIC CULTURE 
In retrospect, the Truman doctrine could be singled out as a turning point, which 
profoundly transformed the American foreign and security policy with significant 
implications for the twentieth century international relations. The multilateral orientation 
assumed by the Truman administration implied that the United States national security 
policy needed to be upgraded according to the new responsibility as well. 
This task was challenged by the traditional style of American national security 
policy, typically developed as response to pressing operational need to solve one 
immediate problem.38 Hence, initial efforts to integrate foreign and domestic policies on 
political and military fields were hindered by the American reliance on a national security 
policy of “mobilizing to meet threats, rather than constantly maintaining adequate 
forces.”39  
Nonetheless, the need for a coherent, far-sighted national security posture was 
addressed in President Truman’s foreign policy. Intended to revolutionize the American 
strategic culture, the 1947 National Security Act, issued during his administration, 
envisaged institutional structure and a comprehensive policy, based on elaborated 
national security goals, concepts, policies and programs. The document proposed 
realignment and reorganization of governmental structures - i.e., United States’ armed                                                  
36 John G. Ruggie, Winning the Peace, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 23-39. 
37 For a detailed description, see John G. Ruggie, Winning the Peace. 
38 For a detailed discussion see Richard Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma, An 
Introduction to the American Experience, Second Edition, New York, Random House, 1987. 
39 Amos A Jordan et al., American National Security, p. 66. 
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forces and foreign policy. Its policy recommendation - i.e., containment - was adopted by 
winter 1947. Hereafter, containment was the fundamental guideline of the U.S. foreign 
policy, with the overarching objective to stop Soviet expansionism.40 The alternatives to 
containment considered at the time were a preventive war strategy with the goal of 
regime change in Soviet Union, and a defensive strategy, which implied massive 
deployment of American forces to Europe.41 Both alternatives were ruled out as the first 
one was considered immoral, and the second too costly. 
Therefore, under the guidance of containment, the U.S. foreign policy aimed to 
build a “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant” posture.42 It was to be implemented 
through a variety of political, diplomatic and economic policies and supported by 
deterrence as military strategy.43 Consistent with each other, the two concepts – 
containment and deterrence – were cost-effective and aimed to avoid military conflict. 
Both qualities appealed to the American public, due to lingering isolationist tendencies. 
Furthermore, the deterrence strategy was favored by the realities of the strategic 
environment - i.e., Soviet superiority in conventional force and American atomic 
monopoly.  
As portrayed by its author, George Kennan, the success of the containment 
strategies depended on confronting the Soviet Union with a united front fighting for a 
common cause. This assumption was the foundation of the multilateral orientation of the 
Truman doctrine, bearing significance for the subsequent development of the newly 
designed international relations.  
Hence, by declaring the American security interests “inextricably linked with 
those of Western Europe,” Truman decided to broaden the definition of security, and 
advance American interest and values through multilateral institutions.44 This approach  
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42 Amos A Jordan et al., American National Security, p. 67. 
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was seen as advancing the long-term interest of the United States, by reducing chances of 
resentment, and thus improving conditions for cooperation within the trans-Atlantic 
alliance through legitimate leadership. 
In other words, at the end of World War II the American political leadership 
decided to build what G. John Ikenberry has called a “constitutional world order” to 
reflect the liberal democratic ideology driving American policy. To cultivate a sense of 
legitimacy, the new order was founded on voluntary participation in a system founded on 
liberal values such as democratic governance, human rights, the rule of law, and free 
markets. Despite national differences, the overarching belief in the importance of open 
and multilateral relations was the ingredient linking the Western democracies together 
under American leadership. As a result, a multi-layered network of regional and global, 
multilateral and bilateral institutions was developed. The focus on democratic and open 
domestic political orders allowed for increased interdependence, leading to mutual and 
reciprocal binding. The newly designed systemic management mechanism reflected the 
American national values and worldview.45 
Essentially, the dramatic experience of the two World Wars stirred a critical quest 
for peace in European inter-state relations as a necessary backdrop for economic 
rebuilding and political cooperation in Western Europe. This resulted in the Western 
European industrial states, the United States and Japan choosing to compromise and 
participate in a system that would promote stability, as critical component for economic 
prosperity. Hence, a mutual and reciprocal binding relationship came about. Although the 
participating nations were motivated by different interests, there was an agreement about 
the mechanisms and mutual benefit. On one hand, the United States was aiming to bind 
the Europeans together and include West Germany in a unified Europe that would lack 
conflict and thus avoid any need for American military intervention. Conversely, the 
Europeans conditioned their cooperation on binding U.S. commitments to their security 
and relied on predictable U.S. leadership behavior, characterized by restraint and 
reassurance.  
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Underlying the entire construction was the strong belief that democracy and open 
markets would result in economic and political transnational ties that would preclude 
future conflicts. Furthermore, the institutional strategies were meant to overcome the 
insecurities that might arise from the asymmetrical balance between the European powers 
and the United States through clearly defined expectations of behavior. The highly 
institutionalized system was developed around regimes, mechanisms and institutional 
norms regulating interactions among member states. By prescribing tolerable state 
behavioral roles, the set of norms succeeded in generating a stable environment, 
“constraining activity and shaping expectations.”46  
D. PREVENTION AND PREEMPTION IN THE COLD WAR 
MULTILATERAL ORDER 
Besides the political, military, and economic policies, throughout the process of 
designing the new institutions, a particular emphasis was placed on efforts to constrain 
the use of force, in order to prevent another escalation of violence. Here as well the 
United States played a critical role.  
Hence, Woodrow Wilsons’ efforts to design the League of Nations constituted the 
foundation of the new international body – i.e., UN - designed “to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war.”47 On this background, the UN Charter advanced 
two overarching principles with regard to the use of force: non-intervention and 
sovereignty. Both are embedded in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibited the 
use of force: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”48  
The Charter did envisage exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force. 
Nonetheless, it limited the range of situations that allow for the legitimate use of force by 
defining particular circumstances qualified as tolerable – i.e., the right to self-defense and 
UN Security Council-authorized intervention in case of aggression. Hence, Article 51  
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declares that “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations,” whereas Article 39 states that:  
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. 
In other words, to assure the legitimacy of such endeavors, Article 39 of the 
Charter vested the Security Council with the legal monopoly on the use of force, 
requiring UNSC authorization for the use of force in cases other than self-defense. 
However, despite efforts to develop norms and standards of acceptable behavior, 
the legitimization of the use of force has remained a source of controversy, especially 
since the UNSC was paralyzed during the Cold War by the U.S. and Soviet vetoes. 
Although the twentieth century normative system may have helped to constrain violence 
in some cases, the gap between the abstract nature of international law and the pragmatic 
approach of statecraft offered at times different perspectives on the circumstances that 
qualify as self-defense.  Specifically, while the legal right to self-defense following an 
attack is a clear and universally accepted concept, the anticipatory use of force for self-
defense still raises disagreements. The controversy stems in part from the resemblance of 
preemptive action to preventive attacks. 
The concepts of preventive and preemptive attack are rooted in the security 
dilemma and may be encouraged in some cases by a “cheap victory strategy.”49 As 
Richard Betts has noted, both concepts combine the two overarching modes of military 
operations - offensive and defensive - by using defensive motivations to justify strategic 
offensives.50 Nonetheless, the two strategies pursue different goals and differ as to their  
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status in international law. Essentially, preventive war is unlawful, while the preemptive 
use of force may be considered legitimate self-defense as long as the criteria established 
by international law have been met. 
Preventive attack is founded on a traditional realist paradigm. It aims at 
precluding a shift in the balance of power seen from the perspective of military 
capability. In preventive war the aggressor sometimes has superior power and aims at 
preserving the status quo. The action is generated by strong belief in military power as a 
decisive factor in international relations. As war is considered inevitable, the underlying 
logic of a preventive war is to strike before any chance of victory is entirely lost. 
Preventive war was considered a legitimate strategy of statecraft in early centuries of 
European history, but it was condemned by Grotius in the seventeenth century. 
Conversely, preemptive attack is morally accepted, when considered an act of 
self-defense in the face of a clear and immediate threat. The preemptive logic is favored 
by the perceived lack of success of other strategies – e.g., containment or deterrence – 
and it  assumes more or less equal military power positions. As opposed to prevention, 
the claim of preemptive self-defense has to be founded on solid and compelling proof of 
both the opponent’s aggressive intention and his capabilities to do immediate harm. 
Anxiety about the risk of misperception, as preparatory reactions to rising tensions might 
easily stir a spiral effect with disastrous consequences, prompted efforts by statesmen to 
establish criteria that would offer predictability about the circumstances that may render 
the anticipatory use of force legitimate.51 
The classic reference used to evaluate the legitimacy of preemption is the 1837 
Caroline incident, which resulted in the formulation, by U.S. Secretary of State Daniel 
Webster, of two essential criteria for the justifiable resort to preemptive attack: necessity 
and proportionality.52 According to Secretary Webster, it is the attacker’s responsibility 
to provide evidence of the necessity of the response determined by circumstances that are 
“instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment of 
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deliberation.”53 In addition, the proportionality of the response related to the threat was 
intended to preclude an escalation of events: “the act, justified by the necessity of self-
defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.”54  
Overall, the legitimacy of the claim of anticipatory self-defense relies on 
compelling evidence that the attack is inevitable in the immediate future, leaving no time 
to employ other measures short of armed forces, and that the anticipatory action will 
reduce or eliminate the threat.55 
In most situations an armed attack will be perceived differently by the attacker 
and the attacked. Hence, the legitimate mechanisms for dispute resolution and decision-
making such as the UN become increasingly significant in the process of assessing the 
degree to which the criteria developed by international law are met. An intense debate 
followed the adoption of the UN Charter, owing mainly to objections to the vagueness of 
its formulations and the UN’s power to infringe on national sovereignty.  
In essence, the issues were disputed by the proponents of the two diverging 
worldviews embedded in the American strategic culture: multilateralists and 
unilateralists. As illustrated earlier, according to their beliefs, the multilateralists 
supported international institutions, while the isolationists repudiated the constraints 
those entail. 
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Despite further efforts in 1970 and 1987 to bring more definitional precision to 
UN provisions’ formulation,56 the dispute produced a polarization of attitudes in two 
camps: “the restrictionists” and the “counter-restrictionists,” each promoting distinct 
interpretations of the preemptive self-defense.57 
The restrictionists uphold a literal interpretation of Article 51, asserting that 
unilateral action for anticipatory self-defense is lawful if it meets the standards of the 
Caroline case.58 They strongly support collective action and reserve to the Security 
Council the right to decide if the evidence presented qualifies the circumstances as 
legitimate self-defense. 
Two historical cases illustrate the restrictionists’ interpretation of UNSC practice 
in evaluating the legitimacy of the anticipatory use of force in self-defense: the 1967 Six-
Day War, and Israel’s 1981 attack on the Osirak reactor in Iraq. While the Security 
Council and the General Assembly rejected proposals to condemn Israel for its actions 
during the Six-Day War, in the case of the attack on the Osirak reactor the Security 
Council unanimously “condemn[ed] the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the 
Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct.”59 The evidence 
confirms that, whereas Israeli behavior in the Six-Day War met the criteria for legitimate 
preemptive self defense established by Secretary Webster, in 1981 Israel’s claim that 
Iraq’s nuclear program posed a threat to its existence did not qualify as a compelling case 
of legitimate anticipatory self-defense. The first case was based on probable and 
imminent aggressive action by Egypt and other Arab states against Israel, while the latter 
case relied merely on Iraq’s hostile policy toward Israel and a projected future capability 
to implement such a policy. Hence, the UNSC displayed reluctance in the case of the 
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1981 attack on the Osirak reactor to accept as a legitimate justification for self-defense a 
case built on circumstances that did not meet all the criteria accredited by the Caroline 
case.  
The UNSC’s unwillingness to legitimate the preemptive use of force in the Osirak 
reactor case may be explained by members’ anxiety about the possible consequences of 
lowering the threshold of established criteria for anticipatory self-defense – i.e., increased 
instability due to greater latitude for the legitimate use of force. In summary, the 
restrictionists consider the use of preemptive force legitimate under the UN Charter only 
if the criteria of necessity and proportionality are met. In their view, more relaxed criteria 
do not provide a sufficient basis for legitimacy. 
Conversely, the counter-restrictionists consider this a narrow interpretation of the 
UN Charter, providing protection to “the aggressor’s right to the first strike.”60 They 
express skepticism regarding the UNSC’s monopoly on the authority to legitimize the use 
of force. Instead, they argue for the validity of the “regime of customary international 
law” established by state practice, which, they maintain, endorses the doctrine of 
anticipatory self-defense.61  
The UNSC’s authority to determine threats to the peace (Article 39 of the 
Charter) is emphasized by counter-restrictionists as a source of legitimacy for 
anticipatory action. They claim that in certain circumstances waiting for the attack to 
occur would be too risky because it would diminish the chances for successful retaliation. 
Moreover, they contend that customary law mirrors the evolution of the international 
security environment more accurately than the UN Charter by encompassing new 
challenges not addressed by the Charter, which was written in 1945. 
Examining the UN Charter and the evolution of customary international law, 
counter-restrictionists argue that today, “given [the] historical record of violations, it 
seems very difficult to conclude that the [UN] charter is truly controlling of state 
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practice.”62 Moreover, they hold that “it can no longer be said that any customary norm 
of state practice constrains the preemptive use of force,”63 considering the numerous 
cases that attest the opposite. The counter-restrictionists conclude that customary 
international law reflects prevailing state practice and that the UN Charter is inconsistent 
with customary international law and current realities.    
The restrictionist and counter-restrictionist attitudes are the result of competing 
worldviews corresponding to the two schools of thought embedded in the American 
strategic culture – i.e., multilateralists and unilateralists. As illustrated earlier, throughout 
the Cold War the two views have been reconciled by the American political leadership 
under the umbrella of a multilateralist approach. 
This chapter presented a brief overview of the American strategic culture in the 
post-World War II era. It analyzed the diverging tendencies and worldviews, as well as 
national and international norms on the use of force. It aimed to provide the background 
for a better understanding of the traditional national values promoted by the United States 
throughout the last half of century.  
The next two chapters develop in detail the American attitude on the use of force 
as reflected in the U.S. national security policy during and after the Cold War, as a 
material expression of the overarching worldview. The goal is to provide the necessary 
insight on the evolution of the American view on the use of force, as influenced by the 
overall worldview. This will help determine if the Bush doctrine of preemption represents 
a shift in the traditional American strategic culture or merely a continuation of previous 
preferences. 
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III. THE US NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY DURING THE 
COLD WAR 
A. THE PREDICAMENT OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY 
POLICY FORMULATION 
As stated in Chapter II, from the Truman administration throughout the Cold War, 
deterrence was one of the overriding concepts that guided American strategic thinking, 
consistently reflected in declaratory strategy. 
Emerging as an alternative to the “cheap-victory strategy,”64 the concept of 
deterrence theory reached the status of an elaborated strategy only after World War II. 
This was the result of the desire to prevent great power wars, stirred by the dramatic 
experience of the two World Wars and the ascending evolution of warfare toward 
increasing levels of destructiveness. The atomic bomb was the innovation that 
contributed substantially, through its greater degree of destructiveness, to the shift of the 
dominant preoccupation with war fighting towards war-prevention. 
For the most part, the concept of deterrence marked a departure from the 
traditional manner of coping with a military threat, typically accomplished through 
military engagement either “via a preemptive attack, or containing it by a vigorous 
defense.”65 By contrast, the goal of deterrence theory was to prevent war, thus 
eliminating the necessity to conduct combat operations. It called for modifying the 
adversary’s intentions by making the consequences of aggression appear too destructive 
to be contemplated – i.e., unacceptable damage. This strategy provoked intense debates 
as many argued that, in addition to attempts to deter threats, contingency planning for 
combat operations was still necessary.  
Although the U.S. deterrence posture was initially more a reality than a policy, the 
loss of the American nuclear monopoly challenged the credibility of that posture. Its 
preservation would require constant and strenuous efforts to develop an actual strategy. 
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Since nuclear war was seen as national suicide, the credibility of the retaliatory threat 
rested on rational strategic objectives consonant with realistic and effective planning of 
the procedures for accomplishing them.  
Essentially, the assessment of the new security environment after 1945 linked the 
deterrent threat to “the problem of use.”66 A strong belief in the likelihood of imminent 
conflict with the Soviet Union was determined by assumptions about the enemy’s 
intentions – i.e., the USSR was viewed as aggressive and “opportunity driven.”67 Hence, 
the concept of deterrence was adopted as an essential element of the American national 
strategy, ultimately reaching the status of a comprehensive concept of “cooperative 
security management.”68  
1. The Policy Debate 
In the process of conceptualization, American strategic thought reached a 
consensus with regard to a rough description of the deterrence concept. However, 
opinions were sharply divided on two overarching issues: designing and operationalizing 
deterrence – i.e., what it took to deter and what capabilities were needed at the 
conventional and nuclear level. 
According to Patrick M. Morgan, while the first debate produced four schools of 
thought – i.e., the rejection school, minimum deterrence, massive destruction, and war-
fighting69 - the latter generated three positions – i.e., “deterrence by a capacity to fight 
then escalate, by a capacity to deny, and by a capacity to defeat.”70  
The Rejection School strongly opposed deterrence in the nuclear age, 
emphasizing the internal inconsistencies of the concept, the danger of human error, the 
reprehensible motivations involved in the “arms race,” the aggravation of the security 
dilemma, and “the immorality of holding whole societies hostage.”71  
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The supporters of the Minimum Deterrence School advocated achieving 
deterrence through a small nuclear arsenal and argued that the devastating power of 
nuclear weapons would overcome any credibility and stability problems. They proposed 
moderating the “arms race” to minimize crises and undermine incentives as well as 
capabilities for preemption.  
At the other end of the spectrum, the Massive Destruction School recommended 
relying on a threat of complete destruction as a deterrent. The logic was to highlight the 
suicidal nature of any attempt to engage in aggression, nuclear or non-nuclear, owing to 
the risk of escalation. This unique feature of nuclear weapons would override credibility 
and stability problems. For this school the danger resided in “pressures to develop first-
strike, counterforce capabilities or effective strategic defenses.”72  
Finally, the War-fighting School considered credibility and stability to require a 
capability to fight and win at any level, thus lowering the opponent’s prospects of 
“military success and political survival.”73 A wide range of capabilities therefore had to 
be developed in order to be able to defend national and allied interests.  
Although the first two schools of thought influenced the decision-making process, 
most of the policy formulations were more heavily influenced by the last two. 
Essentially, the divergence of the solutions envisaged derived from different initial 
assumptions about the strategic conditions and the nature of the opponent. While the 
Massive Destruction School was rooted in the multilateralist creed, the War-fighting 
School was the expression of the unilateralist worldview. As illustrated in Chapter II, 
despite their common internationalist orientation, they were divided by disagreement 
about the manner in which the United States should pursue its interest.  
Overall, their association with the multilateralist and unilateralist worldview 
resulted in different views on the utility of nuclear weapons. The war-fighting proponents 
argued for the application of “operational art to the nuclear era,”74 stressing the necessity 
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to prepare for the contingency of deterrence failure by building capabilities to fight.75 
They attributed utility to nuclear weapons in bargaining for political objectives, through 
escalation dominance.  
Conversely, Massive Destruction supporters emphasized the unique nature of 
nuclear weapons as the fundamental deterrent, given the overwhelming costs they could 
impose.76 They sought an adaptation of strategic thinking to the particularities of the 
nuclear world with regard to the ways in which force may be employed. For them, the 
new weapons denied national governments the function of defense in the traditional 
sense, by altering the government’s ability to protect the nation in the absence of the 
opponent’s cooperation.77 The previous reliance on military advantage as the method of 
protection was replaced with the tacit cooperation of the two opponents.  
The endurance of the two views resulted in two overarching strategies: “assured 
destruction” and counterforce or war-fighting78 - i.e., deterrence by threat of punishment 
and deterrence by denial and defense. The former relied on assured retaliation through 
secure second-strike capability, while the latter emphasized multiple force options. 
Consequently, targeting philosophy was viewed differently - while the first one 
prescribed countervalue attacks, aiming to employ the threat of punishment, the second 
recommended counterforce targets, denying the opponent the capability to win. In 
practice, the United States has since the early 1960s maintained both types of capabilities.  
What is more, the matters were further complicated by the influence of those who 
did not believe in any kind of utility of the use of force. Advocating disarmament and 
arms control, they argued that security can be achieved not only through defense, – i.e., 
the use of force, but also through the lack of force of both sides. Their concerns were 
focused on the adequacy of American efforts to deter Soviet attacks.79 They advocated 
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the introduction of a proper variety of choices of strategic weapons in US strategy so that 
not just defense would matter, but also possibilities for restraining the arms race. Their 
influence brought about, by the 1960’s, consensus among strategists that an analysis of 
security should consider both defense needs and arms control, for a stable deterrence.80  
The divergent approaches to security endured throughout the American strategic 
thinking, comprising the fundamental dilemma of the American national security policy 
formulation in the nuclear era. Although modified over time in conjunction with changes 
in the security environment and technology, the initial concepts have been permanently 
present in the public debate and in the decision making inventory of options. 
Consequently, they have gained primacy at different times in response to transformations 
in the security environment, technological progress, as well as the personal judgments of 
the leadership, resulting in shifts in policy. Overall, the approaches focused on employing 
the value of nuclear weapons in security strategies – i.e. war-fighting and assured 
destruction – held more significance by providing actual plans to defend which have 
reached the status of policies. Nonetheless, the advocacy of disarmament and arms 
control influenced the policy formulation as well.  
B.  OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 
1. The War-Fighting School in National Security Policy  
The war-fighting school of thought received classic expression in the NSC 68. 
The document represented the first comprehensive U.S. national security analysis in the 
Cold War era, aiming to reconcile strategy with structure of forces, by integrating the 
force capability with the overall strategy.81 It laid down the fundamental logic of 
deterrence operating at multiple levels of violence.82 Its rationale was determined by 
anxieties about strategic stalemate. Like George F. Kennan’s containment policy, the 
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strategy was intended to “induce a change in the nature of the Soviet system”83 through 
means other than all-out war. For this purpose, the deterrence posture was to be 
strengthened through various forces capable of dealing with piecemeal aggression and 
subversion in both limited and all-out war. It embedded the Truman administration’s 
effort to build a stronger military posture, in order to cope with the 1948-1949 events and 
the resulting sense of vulnerability.84  
The underlying logic was further elaborated by the flexible response strategy 
adopted by the Kennedy administration. Influenced by the stability-instability paradox,85 
it was concerned about the increased risk of conflict at lower levels of violence as a result 
of strategic stalemate. It proposed a counter-force approach and capability, including 
significant conventional forces. The overarching goal was to control conflict escalation 
and limit the damage to US forces. Thus, retaining the assured destruction forces in 
reserve, the doctrine rendered doubtful the resort to nuclear weapons in a conventional 
war. It emphasized the utility of multiple options in crisis situations as opposed to preset 
war plans.86 Offering strategic options for fighting and winning a nuclear war, the 
strategy was intended to strengthen the deterrence posture’s credibility.87 Furthermore, 
the escalation dominance capability was supposed to allow for a political process of 
negotiation between the opponents, promoting stability.88  
Similarly, the Nixon administration announced a counter-force strategy, at times 
called the Schlesinger doctrine, which aimed at assuring control of escalation and  
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reducing collateral damage.89 It advocated the development of a wide range of nuclear 
options, stressing the importance of capabilities for “smaller strikes which were to be 
counter-force rather than counter-city in character.”90  
The rationale was reaffirmed by the Carter administration, which promoted what 
it called the countervailing strategy.91 Briefly, the strategy recommended deterrence by 
denial – i.e., denying the Soviets any military advantage at all levels of violence. It 
proposed a firm military basis for nuclear weapons, developing operational plans to use 
them based on “advances in the technologies of precision-guidance and small-yield 
warheads, and especially those of command and control.”92 Essentially, conservative 
strategists argued for contingency planning in case deterrence through “mutual assured 
destruction” capabilities failed. It envisaged a variety of types of counterforce options 
and advised preservation of US superior military position. It claimed that developing 
escalation dominance would communicate resolve, while keeping potential conflict under 
control.  
This particular approach was taken further during the Reagan administration,  
which introduced more ambitious plans of winning a nuclear confrontation. The emphasis 
shifted from countervailing to “prevailing,”93 aiming to deny the Soviet Union a range of 
limited nuclear options by developing strategic modernization programs.94 Proponents 
argued that the Reagan strategy was the solution to the nuclear dilemma, that it would 
lead U.S. strategy away from mutual assured destruction. 
2. The Assured Destruction School in National Security Policy  
On the other hand, the logic of the assured destruction strategies has been 
embedded in the Massive Retaliation and Mutual Assured Destruction doctrines.   
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It was the Eisenhower administration’s New Look policy that recommended 
“massive retaliation” as a military doctrine. The military strategy relied heavily on the 
exploitation of US technological prowess. U.S. superiority in strategic nuclear air power 
and tactical nuclear weapons95 was expected to strengthen the US deterrent posture. It 
was considered to reconcile the goals of economic growth and increased military 
strength, resolving the dilemma of security versus solvency.96 The US technological 
advantage was designed to reverse the pattern of interaction in a war with the USSR,97 as 
revealed in 1954 by Secretary of State Dulles:  “depend primarily upon a great capacity 
to retaliate instantly and by means and at places of our own choosing.”98 Driven by a 
belief that strategic stalemate would grant greater stability, through a mutual reluctance to 
initiate war, Dulles held that the strength of the deterrence posture depended on 
increasing the cost of an attack through the threat of massive nuclear retaliation. 
Similar assumptions, enhanced by technological progress, prompted the Nixon 
administration to adopt the strategic sufficiency doctrine99 as a guideline for strategic 
planning for US forces. The assessment of the strategic balance was characterized by a 
rough nuclear parity and the further development of secure second-strike capabilities by 
both superpowers. In this context, the concept of détente gained primacy, as a manner to 
lessen tensions and hostilities. The overarching goal was to achieve and preserve a stable 
strategic balance, which ensured a situation of Mutual Assured Destruction. The 
underlying logic was supported by concepts of “non-zero sum games,”100 in which the 
two superpowers agreed that protection against each other was not possible without the 
opponent’s cooperation. The doctrine prescribed four guiding principles: assured 
destruction, flexible nuclear options, crisis stability, and perceived equality.101 
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3. Prevention in U.S. Policy During the Cold War  
In retrospect, the evolution of American strategic policy during the Cold War 
illustrates an unremitting struggle to reconcile conventional patterns of thinking with the 
unique requirements of nuclear deterrence. The concepts of preventive and preemptive 
attack had a long history, rooted in security dilemma and endorsed by the “cheap victory 
strategy.” Although the nuclear weapons canceled the traditional notion of cheap victory 
through their high level of destruction, the search for effective war-fighting strategies 
never ended as an intrinsic component of national defense preoccupations. By and large, 
although neither preventive nor preemptive concepts were implemented by the U.S. 
government during the Cold War, their shadow loomed large over the process of 
assessment of the strategic situation, notably with reference to the USSR’s perceptions 
and behavior, influencing U.S. decisions about strategy and force structure. 
As Marc Trachtenberg has observed, in the early nuclear era, although ideas of 
preventive war were viewed with hostility by the most important U.S. officials, the thesis 
of preventive war was “common” both in official and unofficial circles, favored by both 
military and civilian observers.102 
At the time, preventive war thinking was favored by several factors. First, it was 
the preset assumptions about the nature of the enemy and the consequences of the end of 
the American nuclear monopoly. In other words some observers were convinced that the 
Soviet Union’s intentions were aggressive, and opportunity-driven and that the Soviet 
leaders might exploit a window of opportunity generated by the decline of American 
supremacy. Secondly, the conviction that the military balance played a decisive role in 
American-Soviet relations generated great interest in preserving the American strategic 
advantage. Hence, people anxious about the perspective of nuclear stalemate and 
persuaded that successful deterrence would depend on maintenance of the U.S. position 
of “nuclear attack-defense superiority,”103 depicted preventive attack to be “the last  
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chance for a plausible alternative.”104 Therefore, the advantage offered by a “first blow” 
in the effort to prevent the Soviets from acquiring nuclear weapons was contemplated 
with great interest in some circles. 
The initial reluctance of American officials to “share” the atomic bomb was taken 
further by proponents of the idea that the United States should take action before its 
nuclear advantage could be neutralized.105 In these circumstances, General Leslie Groves 
and others considered preventive war a “more positive policy” than passively allowing 
the Soviet Union to acquire nuclear power.106   
Hence, although preventive war was ruled out by NSC 68, some of its key points 
were identical to the preventive war arguments.107 It predicted a highly unstable strategic 
environment, as a consequence of the capability gap between the United States and the 
USSR. Moreover, according to the NSC 68, due to Soviet Union’s hostile expansionist 
intentions, atomic stockpiles would lead not to stalemate, but to war.  
By and large, a calculated and gradual coercion was visualized, with the goal “to 
check and to roll back the Kremlin’s drive for world domination,”108 by strengthening the 
US military posture. However, the document was characterized by a built-in 
contradiction because, although it used preventive war arguments, it recommended a 
military buildup as sufficient for the accomplishment of a Soviet rollback.109 
Furthermore, despite the belief in imminent war and the recommendations for the United 
States “to make its stand sooner rather than later,”110 NSC 68 proposed a cautious 
approach pending the rebuilding of American power and warned against the danger of 
provoking a Soviet preemptive attack. Thus, although the enthusiasts advocating an 
expansion of the Korean conflict into a general war with Russia were typically “ignorant 
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of military realities,”111 the preventive war thesis loomed large in the thinking of insiders 
as well, though from a different angle. The mainstream official position, shared by the 
State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended caution due to American 
vulnerability in the face of a global war “at that point.”112 The primary goal was a build 
up of American power for what was considered to be an imminent war with the Soviet 
Union.113 
According to Marc Trachtenberg, it was the Eisenhower administration’s strategy 
that factored in the preventive war thinking. Thus, the assertive stance in the New Look 
and Massive Retaliation policy was a direct result of preset assumptions about Soviet 
intentions, enhanced by preventive war logic and empowered by a resurgence of 
American military power in 1952-1953. Essentially, it was a shift merely in the 
declaratory policy. As the underlying pattern of thinking had been created by the previous 
administration, the shift was finally favored by the Truman administration’s pursuit of the 
NSC 68 military build up.114  Hence, while the new stance in the Massive Retaliation 
appeared more aggressive than other strategies, the reality was that prevention has been a 
very influential in the beginning of the atomic age in one form or another,115 as President 
Truman’s statements of 1952 illustrate: “there wasn’t much of a defense in prospect 
except a vigorous offense.”116 
4. Preemption in the Cold War American Policy 
Nonetheless, objections related to morality and constitutional provisions, as well 
as conscious efforts of mutual self-restraint to prevent crisis escalation, transferred the 
interest toward preemptive action.  
It was Albert Wohlstetter’s work and his concern about the stability of the 
deterrence strategy that emphasized the vulnerability of strategic forces to a surprise 
attack. He underscored the spiral effect of mutual incentives for preemptive attacks 
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triggered by the vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces. The logic of his concept of a 
“delicate balance of terror” was sustained by anxiety about a possible Soviet surprise 
attack and American interest to attack preemptively in a crisis.117 Both positions were 
seen as consequences of strategic vulnerability. Wohlstetter advocated rationalization of 
strategy to employ the use of force in a controlled and credible manner.118 Some took the 
argument even further, suggesting abdication altogether to threaten opponent’s strategic 
forces, either directly or indirectly in order to avoid the provocation of a preemptive 
attack. The end result of this pattern of thinking was the doctrine of strategic stability and 
mutual assured destruction, contributing to the American thinking on arms control.  
Eventually, the perceived utility of preventive or preemptive action was 
substantially undermined in the official policies, leaving room for a willingness to accept 
coexistence.119 This was the result of economic restraints, negative impact on the alliance 
with Europe, the realization that to some extent previous concerns about the Soviets’ 
intentions and risk of war were exaggerated, as well as the image of catastrophic 
consequences of a nuclear war.120 
Regardless of the angle from which the preemptive logic was viewed, it was 
rooted in the uncertainties about the feasibility of containment strategy and stability of 
deterrence. Its proponents recommend improved, flexible military capabilities that would 
offer leaders adequate options to deny the opponent the means for victory and enable the 
U.S. to fight and win a war in various contingencies. 
5. The Overall Outlook of the U.S. National Security Policy 
Despite the cyclical variation of American declaratory strategic policy between 
conflicting concepts, the forces and targeting planning have changed rather less, 
essentially shifting emphasis among the options articulated in Secretary McNamara’s  
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flexible response.121 The Triad doctrine, recommending the development of three types 
of strategic offensive forces122 for three types of attack massive constituted the 
foundation for subsequent improvements.123  
As Colin Gray noted, “nuclear deterrence strategies were tantamount to 
contingent nuclear war-fighting strategies,”124 as the balance between the fear of 
instability and of lacking a possible war-survival advantage if deterrence failed has, 
constantly been tipped in favor of the latter.125 
The gap between the psychological approach of the deterrence doctrine and the 
heavy reliance on security studies of a realist paradigm hampered an accurate 
appreciation of subtleties of a “national and political character of conflicts, shaped by 
social and cultural details of the motivations, perceptions that drive challenges and 
responses.”126  
The lack of historical perspective and empirical data for analysis in the effort to 
design a theory of deterrence, which above all assumed a firm basis of psychological 
analysis, resulted in built-in inconsistencies and an amalgamation of conflicting 
prescriptions. This gave a “cyclical character … [to the] debates”127 on American 
national security issues. The resilience of the different perspectives reinforced this 
pattern. 
In retrospect, the Cold War period is usually perceived as characterized by 
stability due to the bipolar structure of the international relations, enhanced by overall 
successful endeavors to prevent a world war. However, the field of security was highly 
problematic. The United States shifted back and forth between anxieties about its security 
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and moments of superiority and between conflicting recommendation, each perceiving 
the others as irresponsible and hazardous. Finally, the cyclical nature of the quest for 
security was broken by the shift from counterforce primacy to the focus on stability. 
This chapter portrayed the evolution of the U.S. military strategy in the Cold War 
era. The analysis followed the debate among the diverging patterns of thinking and their 
influence on the mainstream policy orientation. The scrutiny illustrates major trends in 
the American national security policy and the causal explanation that favored those 
specific preferences. This offers indications with regards to the process of formation of 
the American view on the use of force, patterns of perceptions and predominant strategic 
preferences of behavior to cope with the perceived threat. Ultimately, the overview of the 
influence the prevention and preemption concepts bore on the U.S. strategic policy 
provides a sound background for the analysis of the Bush doctrine of preemption in light 
of the American strategic culture. 
The next chapter will conduct a similar analysis focused on the post-Cold War 
period. 
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IV. THE US NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY IN POST-COLD 
WAR ERA 
A.  THE POST-COLD WAR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY  
At the end of the Cold War, according to the U.S. position of unchallenged super-
power, the American political leadership once again had to tackle the challenge of 
designing “rules and principles” for a new world order.128  
Apparently the process of reassessment depicted the new security environment as 
free of confrontation, lacking competing ideology that would threaten Western 
democratic values, and an immediate military threat to the US physical security. 
Nonetheless, the liberation from the discipline imposed by the Cold War generated a 
volatile political and security environment marked by regional antagonisms, great 
domestic political instability, ethnic conflict, civil wars, waves of migration and refugees, 
and environmental degradation. As constraints induced by the great powers confrontation 
vanished, political and economic evolutions that previously challenged the system 
management surfaced more fervently, posing questions about standards for national and 
global governance.  
1. The Policy Debate 
By and large, the two predominant views of nuclear weapons’ utility – i.e., 
minimalists and maximalists - were an extension of the Cold War arguments, preserving 
a similar line of reasoning as well as the dilemma of the use of force in the nuclear era.129  
The guidance offered by maximalists with regards to military planning envisaged 
large nuclear forces and thorough planning to employ them in various circumstances 
were advised.130 At the other end of the spectrum, the minimalists were advising reduced 
nuclear forces to support a minimum deterrence policy. According to them, the only role 
for nuclear weapons was to deter a direct nuclear attack on the United States.                                                  
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Ever faithful to their Cold War inheritance, the maximalist school advocated war-
fighting plans resting on counterforce capabilities. They claimed that the United States 
should avoid having preset constraints and use its nuclear posture to threaten, thus deter, 
nuclear, chemical and biological attacks. Moreover, the development of war-fighting 
strategies and capabilities would preclude violence at the lower levels, strengthening the 
credibility of the deterrence posture. 
Conversely, the minimalists recommended the “no first use” policy and opposed 
the war-fighting strategies and counterforce capabilities, considering them provocative 
and generators of instability. They viewed them as undermining the accomplishments 
embedded in the Nonproliferation Treaty.131 The minimalists believed in the unique 
nature of nuclear weapons as real deterrent, due to opponent’s anxiety over the 
overwhelming costs imposed by them. Moreover, they argued that nuclear weapons 
contributed to uphold suspicions and tension between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, sustaining the Cold War longer.132 Hence, they stressed the undermined utility of 
strategic nuclear weapons by the significant role played by political transformation in 
bringing about the end of the Cold War. 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 
With this legacy of the schools of thought that determined the U.S. national 
security policy in the past, the American policymaking community had to tackle the 
challenges resulting from the specificities of the new security environment. The 
conceptual framework required transformations in order to deal with the volatile political 
and security environment that characterized the post-Cold War era. The full realization of 
the effects of interdependence and globalization, generated concern of spillover effects. 
This in turn stirred interest in a more pro-active type of policies, including the need for a 
military force prepared to engage. Although this understanding crystallized as early as the 
first Bush administration, the war-fighting strategies were alleviated by concern for 
preserving the stability of the international system and ideological drive. Therefore, the 
first two post-Cold War administrations – i.e., George H. W. Bush and William Jefferson 
Clinton – implemented cautious, gradual transformations in the national security policy, 
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balanced with efforts to offer reassurance to the other actors in the system of international 
relations. It was not until the second Bush administration that the American national 
security policy shifted toward a firmer stance to manage the challenges posed by the post-
Cold War era. 
1. The Transition Period (George H. W. Bush Administration: 1989-
1993) 
Consequently, the 1991 U.S. National Security Strategy acknowledged the need 
for new terms of reference for nuclear deterrence, along the lines of the structural 
transformation of the security environment. The awareness of the trans-national treats and 
spillover effects triggered the proclamation of the regional conflicts as the new 
organizing principle for American military forces, in light of the interdependence and 
fragmentation of the international political system.133 As a result, a shift of the military 
strategy has been announced from containing the spread of communism through 
deterrence toward a more flexible strategy.  
The new strategic deterrence and defense were intended to offer a wide range of 
response options and a protection system. To roll back proliferation, a transfer of “the 
compass on arms control from East-West to North-South for a much-expanded discussion 
of policy” was announced.134 
With regards to force structure, the document confirmed the continuity of reliance 
on the traditional Cold War Triad,135 while announcing its modernization for enhanced 
effectiveness of deterrence. The perceived lack of imminent threat portrayed the vast 
American military capabilities inherited from the Cold War era as being excessive.136  
Thus, a defense build-down was advocated, including the 1991 President Bush’s decision 
to unilaterally reduce tactical nuclear weapons as a manner to further the arms control 
process developed during the Cold War.137  
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This was the result of the endurance of U.S. concerns about the Russian nuclear 
arsenal, in spite of fading Soviet strength. Hence, the arms control efforts were viewed as 
a way to preserve the relaxation of tension with the Soviet Union, still considered a 
significant player due to its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, the sociopolitical transformations 
in Russia and erosion of the center of authority stirred anxiety about possible 
mismanagement in dealing with WMD.138 (Russia’s weakness) 
The apprehension about the disintegrating Soviet system was heightened by the 
August 1991 communist coup in Moscow. Hence, President Bush announced the 
determination to further negotiate reductions in strategic weapons and to adopt reciprocal 
measures to reduce tactical nuclear weapons.139 These undertakings were intended to 
remove chances of accident as well as incentives for further nuclear proliferation,140 
leading to marginalization of the nuclear weapons. 
Subsequently, the Congressional initiative entitled “Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program,” advanced by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, was adopted in 1996.141 
It allowed for American support for cooperation with the Russian government in coping 
with the threat of inadvertent disaster caused by “loose nukes.”142 In addition, the 
initiative acknowledged the shift of the national security focus from strategic nuclear 
balance to regional and sub-regional levels, with great emphasis on trans-national threats 
and non-state actors.  
Moreover, seeking to prevent possible perceptions of threat, Sir Michael 
Quinlan143 launched the concept of disconnecting nuclear weapons possession from 
specific threats or scenarios, by assigning them the “use of last resort” status. The goal 
was to diminish the provocative nature of elaborated military doctrine involving nuclear 
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weapons, as a source of credibility of the deterrence posture. With this in mind, the 
previous emphasis placed by the American nuclear strategy on doctrines, systems and 
tactics for escalation vanished.  
The post-Cold War U.S. national security strategy shifted toward a greater 
importance on conventional war, while assigning strategic nuclear weapons the role of 
being used as the last resort. The nuclear deterrence endured only in the context of 
extended deterrence, preserved partially due to American geopolitical interests and 
concerns for further nuclear proliferation in its absence.144 The non-strategic nuclear 
forces were to link “conventional defense to the broader strategic nuclear guarantee of the 
United States.”145 In other words tactical nuclear weapons were to boost Western 
advantage in conventional encounter, while deterring opponents’ conventional attacks by 
reinforcing the threat of nuclear response in a military action.  
Meanwhile, in the face of the retreating USSR, the conventional superiority of 
NATO countries had twofold effect: on one hand it allowed the West to marginalize the 
role of nuclear weapons in strategies, while on the other it boosted smaller powers’ 
interest in the proliferation of WMD as the only mean to deter the West.146 Thus, the 
traditional interest in missile defense gained greater momentum in the nuclear debate.  
Revitalized by conservative strategists the missile defense system debate was 
contested by opponents due to its provocative nature and effect of undermined 
deterrence.147 Consequently, President Bush supported the development of ground-based 
interceptors to defend against an incoming bomber or missile attack.148 This was to 
constitute the Global Protection against the Limited Strikes System (GPALS), stimulated  
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by the perceived threat of global ballistic-missile proliferation, as well as accidents due to 
political turmoil.149 The GPALS was to pave the way toward Soviets’ acquiescence for a 
missile defense system. 
Overall, despite efforts to build mutual trust and induce benign political change, 
the Cold War underlying logic of the strategic policies was preserved, still relying on “the 
shape and size of the arsenal.”150 Furthermore, at the time, the US nuclear operations 
were still officially operating under President Regan’s National Security Decision 
Directive 13, reflecting long-standing targeting strategies.151 
The First Gulf War in fact generated the Western understanding of the shape of 
future military encounters. Briefly, the lesson learned by the West was that, on the 
background of atomic deterrent, one consequence of American technological advantage 
will be to trigger pursuit of asymmetrical conflict by smaller powers.152 The envisaged 
goal would be to undermine the Western determination to intervene in regional conflicts, 
and for that purpose countervalue target were considered to be likely. Official documents 
issued by the Clinton administration fully developed the argument.  
2. Cautious Transformation (William Jefferson Clinton Administration: 
1993-2001) 
By and large, the Clinton administration was viewed as a period of stability, 
prudence and conservatism, lacking major initiatives in defense planning.153 The two 
significant reviews of the defense policy emphasized the need to be able to fight “two 
simultaneous major regional contingencies.”154 
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Essentially, the 1993 Nuclear Posture Review concluded that the traditional 
American force structure155 was to be retained due to enduring Russian threat, as well as 
extended deterrence to chemical and biological weapons.156 The defense strategy was 
designed along three pillars: preventing the emergence of threats, deterring and defeating 
the existing threats by military force. Various mechanisms were to be used to implement 
the strategy.  
Thus, the prevention of threats was to be achieved through confidence-building 
measures, promoting the spread of democracy overseas and countering the proliferation 
of WMD. The credibility of the deterrence strategy was to be fostered by a demonstrated 
will to use force when vital interests were threatened. For this purpose, effective nuclear 
force and forward-deployed conventional forces with enhanced projection capability 
were planned. The third pillar of the defense strategy was resting on “readiness, high 
technology weapons, and superior information systems, to ensure victory.”157 All tasks 
were to be completed on the backdrop of multilateral security dialogues, which would 
help strengthen traditional alliances, build a partnership with Russia, and pursue a 
comprehensive engagement with China.158  
Nonetheless, as a result of the Desert Storm experience, the greatest concern was 
grounded in the proliferation of WMD.159 Therefore, the 1997 U.S. National Military 
Strategy linked all four principal threats to U.S. security – i.e., “regional dangers, 
asymmetric challenges, transnational threats, and wild cards”160 - to the WMD 
proliferation. The fundamental logic was that the possession of WMD was enabling 
regional powers to pursue ambitions by increasing the price of Western intervention to 
unacceptable levels. More importantly, the Desert Storm experience raised awareness  
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about the limited ability of the Coalition forces to confront an adversary armed with 
NBC, as well as the political effect of their possession and potential use upon the civilian 
population.161 
The Clinton administration tackled the issue in a twofold approach: continued 
efforts in the realm of arms control and disarmament, as well as endeavors to develop a 
more comprehensive military approach and capabilities to cope with the WMD threat. 
Hence, building on the work completed during the Bush administration, in 1993 President 
Clinton publicly announced the new concept of the Defense Counter-proliferation 
Initiative (DCI), centered on four elements: “prevention, roll back, deterrence, and 
adaptation.162” 
Initially, despite acknowledging the threat of WMD in regional conflicts163 as 
asymmetrical means, counter-proliferation strategies were not incorporated in DoD 
planning. This decision was determined by the intense controversy within the American 
governmental circles about DCI. Furthermore, it was believed by the international 
community that DCI military component embedded a preemptive counter-force planning, 
with undermining results for nonproliferation diplomacy.164 This contributed to the 
widespread perception of DCI as an excessively provocative initiative. 
Hence, it was only after the development of thorough planning and extensive 
bilateral and multilateral efforts that acceptance by the international community was 
brought about.165 Subsequent documents announced that balanced military planning has 
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been designed to strengthen and not undercut diplomatic efforts.166 Hereafter, counter-
proliferation strategies have been a key element of U.S. military planning, incorporated 
into the U.S. National Security Strategies to follow. Guidelines for its conduct have been 
developed along the lines of two broad categories: prevention and protection.167 
Overall, the strategy was founded on cautiously balanced diplomatic and military 
tactics. The improved technology security and export controls that would disrupt the 
trade of WMD were intended to deny proliferation. This was complemented by 
reassurance and dissuasion, which would eliminate the need to resort to NBC 
proliferation as a form of assuring security, while emphasizing the cost of proliferation. 
The means envisaged for this purpose were regional security dialogue, arms control, 
confidence-building measures, security assistance, and public diplomacy. Additionally, 
the measures to reverse proliferation helped to further expand the range of prevention, 
through programs such as Cooperative Threat Reduction.168 Conversely, the protection 
category comprised military oriented solutions as well. These were based on improved 
capabilities to actively and passively defend, through defensive and offensive measures 
policies, plans, and programs.169 
With regards to missile defense, in the final years of President Clinton’s 
administration plans were developed for a National Missile Defense. They were intended 
to defend against small threats from rogue states, – i.e. states with distressed and reckless 
regimes, reacting to regional concerns.170 Nevertheless, concerns about Russian and 
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Chinese perceptions of such developments led President Clinton to impose stabilizing 
conditions for progress: technological viability, a persuasive threat analysis, economic 
feasibility, and compliance with arms control and allied considerations. In 1997, the 
PDD-60 declared the possible use of nuclear weapons in case of chemical or biological 
attack. However, the persisting Russian hostility to amending the 1972 ABM Treaty 
resulted in the Clinton administration’s decision to postpone firm commitment to 
deployment of NMD until the summer of 2000,171 when it was deferred to the next 
administration. The issue was settled by President George W. Bush, whom, on 13 
December 2001, gave Russia notice of the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, in 
order to begin preparations for a limited National Missile Defense. Although the decision 
was highly controversial, the administration argued for the need to protect the United 
States from nuclear blackmail by rogue states. The decision was favored by the new Bush 
administration worldview and strategic re-assessment. 
3. The Dawn of a New American Foreign Policy: George W. Bush 
Administration (2000- ) 
Essentially, the President George W. Bush’s electoral campaign announced his 
determination to overcome the legacy of the Cold War and achieve adjustment to the new 
security environment, especially in light of more positive relations with Russia. However, 
at the outset of his presidency, the longstanding predominant distress about ascendant 
China and Russia was still primary concern of the security assessment.  
The landmark issue of the new administration was the growing concern with 
America’s own extensive ambitions and commitments to maintain regional and global 
order.172 It was stressed that the discontented smaller powers might use nuclear threats to 
coerce the United States to either discontinue ongoing interference, or undermine its will 
for future endeavors.173 Even though non-state actors were mentioned as potential source 
of threat, the pattern of thinking was still very much focused on states. Hence, the 
propensity to break with the past was initially focused mainly on overcoming the Mutual 
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Assured Destruction strategies and promoting NMD. Nonetheless, the terrorist attacks of 
September 2001 radically transformed the perception of source of threat, at the same time 
generating an intense sense of vulnerability among the American public.  
A resilient determination to assume a more assertive stance on the international 
relations arena resulted in an enhanced interest in counter-proliferation strategies. In the 
new circumstances, previous concerns harbored by Clinton administration with regards to 
the perceived association of counterproliferation with preemptive action were outdated by 
what the new administration called an urgency to tackle more firmly the threat posed by 
rogue states, non-state actors and terrorism. 
The shift in the U.S. foreign policy’s focus was announced publicly, by President 
Bush, on 20 September 2001 in an “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the 
American People.”174 The address declared in effect “War on Terrorism” as the chief 
American priority. Subsequent public statements of the Bush administration officials as 
well as official documents offered guidelines for implementation. 
As a result, in the context of the new security assessment, the 2001 Quadrennial 
Defense Review and the January 2002 Nuclear Posture Review made recommendations 
for the transformation of the US military strategy, planning and force structure. The 
analysis identified a fluid and dynamic security environment. A wide spectrum of 
contingencies were foreseen, related to uncertain identity and number of potential 
opponents as sources of possible conflict, as well as type of attack. Both documents 
advanced four key elements as pillars for the emergent security strategy: assuring allies, 
dissuading potential enemies, deterring threats and countering coercion against the U.S., 
and defeating adversaries.175 Additionally, there was a strong recommendation to shift 
the U.S. deterrence strategy from the threat by punishment to threat by denial. On this 
background, the development of counterforce capabilities and missile defenses were seen 
as top priorities. 
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At planning level, this entailed a shift from the traditional threat-based nuclear 
planning to a capabilities-based approach,176 prescribing a wider range of capabilities. 
The resulting flexibility would enable the U.S. military to cope with unpredictable range 
and types of opponents and contingencies. 
By and large, albeit reduced, the Cold War nuclear triad was maintained as a 
foundation for the New Triad, which included both non-nuclear and nuclear capabilities. 
The nuclear forces would continue to play an essential role in supporting U.S. 
commitments, dissuading arms competition and deterring hostile opponents. However, 
the novelty of the New Triad was the augmentation of the nuclear weapons with active 
and passive defensive systems.177 That is to say that the New Triad comprises two 
categories of nuclear forces: the operationally deployed forces for immediate or 
unexpected contingencies, and the responsive forces for potential contingencies. The 
latter enhanced the former through the capability for force reconstitution.178 
The non-nuclear weapons and defense capabilities were providing a break away 
from outdated Mutual Assured Destruction, enhancing the credibility of the US 
deterrence posture. While the active defense capabilities would provide protection in case 
of failed deterrence, the non-nuclear capabilities would further reduce the dependency of 
the offensive component on nuclear forces. A high-quality command control, intelligence 
and adaptive planning was envisaged to enhance overall effectiveness.179 
According to Undersecretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith, the new approach 
intended to integrate nuclear forces with other military capabilities, rather than isolating 
them, to achieve a synergy between all defense components. By supplementing their use 
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with non-nuclear strike capabilities or defensive systems, the nuclear weapons were 
linked to multiple defense policy goals. Reduced reliance of the strategic planning on 
offensive systems allowed the necessary flexibility for defense adaptive planning in 
unexpected situations, thus facilitating real-time response to changes in the strategic 
environment.  
Other defense goals were approached as well by the NPR: allies would be assured 
through substantial reductions of nuclear capabilities and credible non-nuclear and 
nuclear response options to support U.S. commitments. As concerns with the threat posed 
by terrorists and rogue states armed with WMD were particularly emphasized, states like 
North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya were singled out as possible contingencies. 
Furthermore, the possibility of use of nuclear weapons in such contingencies was 
mentioned. In addition, China and Russia still appeared on the list of security 
concerns.180 The underlining reason for the proposed shift was rooted in the utter 
unpredictability of the new security environment, and a greater expectation of failed 
deterrence.  
4. Bush Doctrine of Preemption 
The 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy took the NPR’s recommendations 
further, emphasizing an explicit shift in emphasis placed on components of pre-existent 
strategies, thus marking a fundamental transformation in the American foreign policy.  
The proactive counter-proliferation military strategies gained primacy in the new 
policy approach, downgrading the previous focus on diplomatic dissuasion through 
traditional non-proliferation measures.181 The new strategy announced the elevation of 
“anticipatory action to defeat imminent threat” at the level of primary policy, justified by 
the determination to ”forestall or prevent hostile acts by … adversary.”182 The document 
emphasized the risks posed by inaction in dealing with fused threats of rogue states, 
terrorism, diffused technology, and the increasing willingness of the adversaries to use 
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WMD.183 The argument made was that the advance of technology alters the real-time 
actions to defend against threats. Thus, while traditional diplomatic undertakings184 were 
still considered useful, the document pointed to their limitations, confirmed by the reality 
of proliferation.  
Moreover, consideration of the improved ability of the adversaries to deceive 
threat assessment, through access to dual-use technologies, and rapid pace of 
technological progress, resulted in anxiety about surprise attacks. Consequently, 
relaxation of the conventional understanding of the concept of “imminent threat” was 
advocated, as well as more offensive approaches to prevent future attacks.185 For this 
purpose, while the U.S. would uphold its ability to deter by threat of overwhelming 
destruction, the new strategies were designed to include a wide spectrum of responses to 
allow tailoring appropriate responses according to particular situations.186  
Furthermore, the initial intention of the Republican Party to withdraw from the 
ABM Treaty, was bolstered by the U.S. led campaign against terrorism.187 Thus, 
although the attack on 11 September 2001 undermined the rationale for missile defence 
in dealing with terrorist attacks, the anxiety about homeland vulnerability prevailed, 
resulting in the December 2002 announcement to launch a limited National Missile 
Defense system by 2004.188 From the new deterrent posture perspective, the withdrawal 
from the ABM Treaty was seen as just one of the necessary measures contributing to 
fostering credibility and assuring protection.189 
A series of official strategies were designed to detail the overarching worldview 
embedded in the U.S. National Security Strategy, offering more specific guidance – i.e., 
July 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security, December 2002 National Strategy to  
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Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and February 2003 National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism. By and large, all documents were part of an effort to design a 
comprehensive strategy to tackle the new threats of rogue states, terrorism and WMD.  
This chapter portrayed the evolution of the U.S. military strategy in the post-Cold 
War era. The analysis illustrates major trends in the American national security policy 
and the causal explanation that favored those specific preferences. This offers indications 
with regards to the process of adaptation of the American view on the use of force to the 
new security environment. It illustrates the elements of continuity, as well as the 
transformation of the American perceptions and predominant strategic preferences of 
behavior to cope with the perceived threat. Ultimately, the line of reasoning provided by 
the current administration in justifying the policy transformations adopted, including the 
Bush doctrine of preemption, are depicted.  
The next chapter will conclude by examining the significance of the Bush 
doctrine of preemption from the different perspectives offered by previous chapters. In 
other words, the analysis will consider particularities of the American strategic culture 
and practice, as well as international law provisions. The aim is to determine the 
prospects of durability of the current trend in the American strategic policy. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A.  THE 2002 U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY IN LIGHT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW  
1. The 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy: Preemption or Prevention?  
The policy articulated in the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy set in motion a 
great controversy among international law experts. By elevating the preemption doctrine 
to the status of a primary policy, the Bush doctrine was considered to reflect an expansive 
view of rights under the law on the recourse to force, or jus ad bellum. Overall, the end 
result foreseen was one of destabilizing the international system.190  
Many observers at home and abroad were alarmed by the U.S. government’s 
decision to redefine the concept of the imminence of a threat. The proposal to alter one of 
the fundamental criteria for preemptive action under customary international law without 
specifying the particular circumstances that would legitimate preemptive action was 
perceived by allies as hazardous. Their concerns were captured by Pierre Hassner:  “to 
generalize … a doctrine centered around the idea of launching a unilateral first strike 
against any state that possesses or builds weapons of mass destruction … means creating 
a situation of permanent or open-ended exception and insecurity.”191 
Moreover, critics questioned the confusing and inexact use of the two distinct 
notions of preemption and prevention in the U.S. documents. It was noted that in the 
context of the declared U.S. goal of maintaining predominance, the call for preemptive 
war bore a strong resemblance to the pursuit of preventive war along offensive realist 
lines. To be precise, the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy’s endorsement of 
preemptive action as a means to “prevent … enemies from threatening” the United States 
and its allies was seen as taking the already contentious discussion of anticipatory self- 
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defense “a step further into the realm of subjectivity.”192 In essence, the American 
administration’s willingness to use force in order to prevent threats from emerging 
repositioned the discussion in the realm of prevention.193  
In this respect, some European observers argued that the new conceptual 
framework seemed to derive from earlier centuries’ focus on international politics as 
great-power rivalry.194 Although the American determination to tackle challenges of the 
new security environment, as illustrated by the broad international support for the U.S.-
led intervention in Afghanistan, the new, aggressive tendency was seen as endangering 
achievements in international law. Thus, the lack of clearly defined standards for 
operations under the new preemption doctrine generated unease among American and 
foreign critics. They argued that official documents have to be carefully worded to avoid 
destabilizing effects.195 
In addition, this anxiety was enhanced by President Bush declaration that the U.S. 
“will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those 
[states] who harbor them.”196 This statement failed to adhere to the customary 
international law of state responsibility,197 which holds that states should not be held 
accountable for the actions of non-state actors on their territory unless:  
the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or 
under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct, … 
if the person or group of persons is in fact exercising elements of the  
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governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities, 
[and] … if and to the extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the 
conduct in question as its own.198 
It follows that the American decision to treat equally non-state actors and the 
states harboring them stirred concern about the danger of blurring the distinction between 
states and non-state actors. Although in the 1990’s, the range of justifications for 
intervention broadened significantly, state sovereignty remains an important factor in 
preserving international stability. Thus, action taken under the new U.S. policy, 
especially in the absence of compelling evidence, was considered to generate severe 
consequences for the stability of the international system.  
Finally, the United States government promoted regime change as a method to 
achieve non-proliferation ends. This approach was inconsistent with respect to state 
sovereignty, a primordial right under the UN Charter as well as the central stabilizing rule 
in international politics. 
Despite the Bush administration’s criticism of the UNSC’s rigidity and 
irrelevance, the members of the international community displayed willingness to adapt 
international law provisions to current threats. This was illustrated by the UN and NATO 
members’ supportive attitude in the immediate aftermath of the September 2001 attacks 
on the United States. To be exact, the very next day the UN issued a resolution 
condemning the attacks and recognizing the inherent right of the United States to 
individual and collective self-defense. The resolution stated that the United Nations 
“regards such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international 
peace and security” and expressed “readiness to take all necessary steps to respond.”199 
Concurrently, NATO’s North Atlantic Council invoked Article V for the first time in its  
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history, embodying the members’ “commitment to collective self-defense.”200 Similarly, 
numerous other governments around the world expressed solidarity with the United 
States. 
Furthermore, UNSC resolution 1373 followed later the same month, requesting 
states to undertake specific measures to bring the problem of terrorism under control.201 
The foundation for this latter action rested on a previous UNSC resolution – i.e., 1189 
issued on 13 August 1998 – which stressed: 
every Member State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, 
assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in 
organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of 
such acts.202 
Nonetheless, in spite of the UN members’ determination to tackle the challenge of 
terrorism the subsequent American claims of preemptive action in Iraq illustrated the 
limit of UN members’ willingness to infringe upon long-standing norms of behavior in 
the absence of compelling evidence.203 
2. The 2003 US-Led Intervention in Iraq  
The clash between the Bush administration’s view and the traditional standards 
established by international law occurred during the debate preceding the U.S.-led 
military action in Iraq. 
In brief, building on the provisions of the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, 
the American administration proposed military intervention in Iraq and regime change. 
U.S. officials based their arguments for what they termed “preemptive” action against 
Iraq on its noncompliance with numerous UNSC resolutions through its supposed 
acquisition of WMD. In addition, the administration invoked Saddam Hussein’s alleged 
connection with the Al Qaeda terrorist organization. Hence, in light of the declared war  
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on terrorism and states that harbor terrorist organizations and in view of the threat that 
Saddam Hussein’s possession of WMD posed to the United States, the Bush 
administration declared that anticipatory self-defense was justified. 
The UNSC responded to the proposed U.S.-led intervention by adopting 
resolution 1441, issued on 7 November 2002, which found Iraq in material breach of 
previous resolutions. It established a new inspection regime and warned against serious 
consequences in case of Iraq’s failure to cooperate. However, the resolution did not 
explicitly authorize military intervention in Iraq. The Resolution declared that the 
Security Council: 
Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its 
obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in 
particular through Iraq’s failure to cooperate with United Nations 
inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under 
paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991) … 
… decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of 
bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process 
established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the 
Council;204 
Moreover, numerous UN members contested the subsequent attempt of Secretary 
Powell to make the case for military action. First, the evidence presented with regard to a 
connection between the Iraqi government and Al Qaeda organization was widely 
considered unpersuasive, or at any rate not convincing enough to justify a breach of 
Iraq’s sovereignty. Second, the inspection reports did not indicate any conclusive 
information regarding Iraq’s possession of WMD. Therefore, France, Germany, and 
Russia proposed more time for inspections. They argued that the requirement of an 
imminent threat as a criterion for preemption was not met in Iraq’s case. Therefore, in 
their view, obtaining undeniable proof to support the American claim and exhausting 
peaceful efforts were viewed as critical for the legitimacy of a military intervention.205 
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When U.S. officials declared that an intervention in Iraq would aim, along with 
addressing non-proliferation, at regime change, China, France, and Russia revealed their 
decision to veto any resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq.206 As a result, in 
March 2003 Washington and London announced that the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq 
would be launched relying on the legal basis offered by UNSC resolutions 678, 687 and 
1441. They argued that, based on Iraq’s violation of the terms of ceasefire, past 
resolutions provided a continuing or resumed authority to use force.207 
As expected, an intense debate followed regarding the validity and legitimacy of 
such an undertaking. The claim of continuing authority to use force under a UNSC 
resolution has been challenged on the grounds that the previous resolutions referred to 
specific situations – e.g., Resolution 678 referred to a collective action, including the 
government of Kuwait. Moreover, the public announcement by three permanent members 
of the Security Council of their intention to veto any resolution explicitly authorizing the 
prospective action substantiated a perspective at odds with the U.S. position. Therefore in 
spite of the British and American assertion of resumed authority, the 2003 military 
intervention in Iraq lacked wide international support and amounted to “a war of choice,” 
as Adam Roberts, among others, has termed it.208  
Overall, the American assertions about the urgency of preemptive action in Iraq 
were perceived as the fulfillment of the European allies’ anxieties initially stirred by the 
U.S. National Security Strategy’s unilateral stance. Many observers held that the 
evidence of Iraq’s possession of WMD and Saddam Hussein’s connection with Al Qaeda 
was feeble and that it did not reasonably meet the criterion of imminence of threat for a 
legally justifiable preemptive use of force. Furthermore, human rights violations were a 
chronic issue in Iraq and by no means more acute at the time of proposed military action 
than at other moments in recent history. It follows that the credibility of the pressing 
humanitarian justification for the intervention was doubtful.  
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Thus, some UN members displayed reluctance to set a precedent for behavior that 
violates the UN Charter. This indicated a limit of international tolerance for radical 
transformations of the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention. They argued that the 
UN Charter was intended to offer flexibility in tackling cases dependent on a particular 
context. However, the expansion of rationales to an open-ended situation has been 
strongly contested. Adopting a highly generalized doctrine which would infringe the 
norms regarded as cornerstones of international law and international stability – i.e., 
sovereignty, state responsibility and non-intervention was perceived dangerous and 
prompted stiff resistance to the American proposals.209  
Although customary international law has been invoked as a legal base for a 
relaxed understanding of preemption, it was the possibility of setting a precedent for 
future behavior that particularly prompted some UN members to deny the existence of a 
consensus on an ambiguous situation. The military intervention in Iraq was considered to 
lean too much toward prevention, even if the American administration termed it 
preemption. Therefore, the UNSC members considered that endorsement of an action 
without firm roots in international law would amount to a self-fulfilling prophecy of 
increased proliferation and terrorism as well as the increased reliance on the justification 
of anticipatory self-defense by an ever-growing number of states bent on intervention.210  
The desire for added precision was boosted by the lack of focus in the American 
justifications. This lack of specificity was seen as stimulating suspicion and animosity, 
especially in the Muslim world. Alternating between enforcement of the UNSC 
resolutions, anticipatory self-defense, prevention, regime change for non-proliferation, 
and for humanitarian reasons, the American proposal generated confusion with regards to 
the real purpose of the military action.211 Moreover, by linking the preemption doctrine 
with regime change and the war on terrorism, the Bush administration presented the 
international community with a “single package,” forcing them into an extreme decision 
with little room for consultation.  
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In this context, the failure of the American officials to take into consideration the 
other states’ concerns and constraints undermined the chances for cooperation.212 The 
unilaterally imposed timeline, which left no room for the alignment of the other states’ 
policies, made it easy to depict the American administration as eager to disengage from 
the norms and regulations of established over a half of a century of institution 
building.213 Furthermore, the U.S. attitude of open defiance of the Charter system and the 
material steps taken to act unilaterally even before initiating negotiations for multilateral 
action generated resentment and undermined the likelihood of reaching a consensus.214  
The condescending tone of the American proposal to act against Iraq, as well as 
the U.S. Congress’ authorization for use of force against Iraq without UN approval, 
enhanced international concerns about the unilateral stance of the new American foreign 
policy. The new American policy towards Iraq was interpreted as the materialization of 
the worst anxieties stirred by the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy. 
B. THE BUSH DOCTRINE IN LIGHT OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC CULTURE 
1. Competing Worldviews 
Nonetheless, although the Bush administration’s foreign policy was perceived as 
being an unexpected and impulsive break with the traditional American strategic culture 
and international norms of the use of force, this approach has been advocated 
systematically in the United States after the end of the Cold War.  
At the end of the Cold War, confronted with the task of redesigning the world 
order and amending its national policies, the American policymaking community was 
divided about the manner in which to pursue national interests more effectively. The 
divide can be traced back to the end of World War II when the American elites were 
facing similar circumstances and challenges regarding the nature of the international 
order. In many respects the post-Cold-War debate resembled the deliberations of more 
than half of century ago about American foreign policy.215  
                                                 
212 Adam Roberts, “Law and the Use of Force After Iraq,” p. 51.  
213 Francois Heisbourg, “Is Preemption Necessary?,” p.75. 
214 Tom J. Farer, “The Prospect for International Law and Order in the Wake of Iraq,” The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, No. 3, July 2003, p. 626. 
215 John Ruggie, Winning the Peace, NY, Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 2-3. 
61 
By and large, at the end of the Cold War the majority of American political 
leaders associated themselves with the internationalist creed. However, by the mid-
1990’s a new group of isolationists gained prominence. Advanced by the conservative 
wing of the Republican Party, the isolationist view advocated a modest international 
position of the U.S. They recommend abandonment of its dominant role in international 
relations and supported the prospect of a multipolar world. Their goal was to free the 
United States of the burden of leadership. However like their precursors at the end of the 
World War II, the isolationists’ view of foreign policy was refuted by the realities of 
globalization and interdependence.216 
Thus having yet again defeated isolationism, internationalist views prevailed in 
the United States at the end of the Cold War. Nonetheless, the internationalists were 
divided in various competing forms, according to other influences – i.e., idealism, 
pacifism, realism, etc. Overall, two groups within the internationalist camp gained 
predominant influence: multilateralists and unilateralists. The key difference between 
them was their policy preference for creating international order. The multilateralists 
advocated institutionalized commitments along communitarian organizing principles. 
Conversely, the unilateralists were characterized by aversion to weakened sovereignty 
through international institutions. They rejected constraints placed by international 
commitments on American power, campaigning for an assertive stance in pursuing 
national interests.217 
Advocating a collective security approach as a system-management mechanism, 
the multilateralists viewed the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to empower the UN 
to function as initially envisaged.218 They placed great emphasis on consultation and 
cooperation as a means to share the burden of coping with the ramifications of 
globalization and economic interdependence. They stressed the nature of the American 
style of power management as a determining factor in enabling successful, cost-effective 
leadership. Reassuring and persuading partners to follow, they deemed, best served U.S. 
long-term interests by reducing the cost of world-management through burden-sharing.  
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Alternatively, the unilateralists focused on the U.S.’ position as a sole 
superpower, favoring preventive action for its preservation. This was virtually a revival 
of similar views that flourished in the late-1940’s when anxieties about the loss of atomic 
monopoly prompted consideration of preventive nuclear war to maintain the Western 
position of “nuclear attack-defense superiority.”219 It was a worldview rooted in the 
realist paradigm, aiming to maximize America’s freedom to act and to use its strength to 
preserve its position in the system.220 It defined the national interest narrowly and 
emphasized the immediate practical efficacy in the foreign policy.221 
2.  The Bush Doctrine – A Revolution in the American Strategic Policy? 
The unilateral trend in American foreign policy surfaced during the first Bush 
administration (January 1989 - January 1992). The draft of the 1992 U.S. Defense 
Planning Guidance stands as evidence of the emergence of this pattern of thinking. 
Conceived under Paul Wolfowitz’s supervision, the document argued for preservation of 
U.S. worldwide predominance: “our number one mission in the world, now that we are 
the sole superpower, is to make sure we stay that way.”222 These right wing 
conservatives advocated that American foreign policy focus on “precluding the 
emergence of any potential future global competitor.”223 Informed by a Hobessian view 
of the world, they described the world as a dangerous place despite the end of the Cold 
War. Russia’s recovery was still viewed as possible, while the potential rise of Germany, 
Japan and China as challenging military powers was considered threatening.  
Furthermore, the document proposed intervention in Iraq, arguing that the First 
Gulf War ended prematurely.224 In an effort to cope with the new security challenges, 
their prescription was an “assertive, often unilateralist approach to world affairs.”225 
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Nonetheless, the first two post-Cold War U.S. administrations came into office 
with multilateralist views of the world, tinged with Wilsonian rhetoric and aspirations. As 
a result, throughout the first decade after the end of the Cold War, the American decision-
making community constantly rejected unilateralist recommendations. 
The first Bush administration emphasized cooperative deterrence and joint action 
as the primary features of the new world order. Subsequently, from 1992-1999 President 
Clinton followed a similar path, aiming to consolidate international peace and stability 
through the spread of free-markets and democracy.226 The Clinton grand strategy of 
engagement and enlargement essentially projected a liberal international order, where 
non-proliferation was pursued through the spread of democracy, security assurance and 
integration into the globalized economy.227 
Although its recommendations were rejected, the unilateralist trend endured, with 
its proponents making continuous efforts to influence American policy. Their first 
significant success occurred in 1994, when at the urging of the Congressional 
Republicans, the Republican Party adopted a common platform, entitled “The Contract 
with America.”228 In essence, it renounced America’s international commitments and 
criticized the Clinton administration for “subordinating US interests in favor of ill-
defined goals and policies established by international civil servants and foreign 
nations.”229 
Subsequent efforts to advance the argument of preemptive action resulted in a 
1998 public letter addressed to President Clinton, and a 2000 report “Rebuilding 
America’s Defenses.” Both documents advocated a more assertive U.S. foreign policy 
with specific emphasis on the Middle East, notably advocating regime change in Iraq.230  
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Eventually, the unilateralist agenda did influence to some extent the Clinton 
administration’s foreign policy. First, after the U.S. suffered casualties in Somalia, 
unilateralists succeed in limiting the UN missions in which American troops were 
involved. Next, in 1998 the Iraq Liberation Act declared the U.S. Congress’ support for a 
new U.S. policy to secure the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Likewise, the 
proponents of unilateralist proposals inspired the efforts made by the Clinton 
administration to develop a National Missile Defense, a promise made by the 
Republicans in their “Contract with America.”231  
However, by and large the unilateralist drive had been unsuccessful in 
transforming the mainstream policy prior to the terrorist attacks of September 2001. The 
Clinton administration succeeded in preserving a multilateral stance in American security 
policy, and through consultation, reassurance and accommodation promoted a cautious 
transformation with the allies’ acquiescence. The ultimate watered-down form of these 
policies reflected the careful balance of the unilateralist view with the Administration’s 
multilateral efforts, and did much to alleviate possible controversies with traditional 
allies.  
It was not until the current Bush administration took office that the unilateralists 
gained primacy within the security policymaking community. Profoundly skeptical of 
international organizations and ill at ease with constraints placed on America’s freedom 
to act, the new Republican administration initially seemed to advance an isolationist 
approach. They advocated “humility in America’s dealings overseas” and rejected 
democracy promotion and nation-building as irresponsible arrogance.232 Nevertheless, 
following the September 2001 attacks on the United States, the American perception of 
its vulnerability generated favorable conditions for this unilateralist influence to flourish.  
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Furthermore, the fact that the same representatives who supported the 1992 U.S. Defense 
Planning Guidance once again held high official positions in the new Administration 
empowered them to influence the debate within governmental circles.  
Thus the Bush administration adopted a more assertive stance, shifting the 
emphasis toward a unilateralist approach.233 Numerous decisions confirm the new 
orientation of the new American stance: the decision to remove the U.S. executive’s 
approval from the Kyoto Protocol, tariffs imposed on imported steel, the refusal to sign 
onto the international mine ban treaty, the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and the 
decision to revoke the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court treaty. 
However, it was the transformation produced by the new Administration’s 
security policy that stirred a vocal reaction from the international community. The 
resemblance of the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy to the draft of the 1992 U.S. 
Defense Planning Guidance confirmed an unambiguous shift in the American security 
policy towards a unilateralist stance. Although sporadic efforts were made to create an 
international consensus, the new “a la carte multilateralism,” as Richard Haass termed it, 
comprising ad-hoc “coalitions of the willing” as opposed to the traditional 
institutionalized alliances, was in fact founded on a strong unilateralist view.234 This 
initial anxiety was reinforced by the Administration’s decision to elevate preemption to a 
primary policy option, its public determination to “act preventively against potential 
threats,” and its willingness to pursue regime change through the use of force.235  
Replicating the worldview advocated consistently by the unilateralists throughout 
the last decade, the new security policy is not a revolution per se in the goals traditionally 
promoted by the U.S. foreign policy. Nonetheless, it is a radical change in the means 
favored to pursue them.236  
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Indeed, most of the policies adopted by the new administration were, in essence, a 
continuation of the Clinton administration’s initiatives. As illustrated earlier, the National 
Missile Defense, the counter-proliferation strategies, and even the regime change policy 
were present in the Clinton administration.  
Nevertheless, it is the overall unilateralist stance and willingness to use force, 
echoing the “hegemonist argument,” that alarmed the international community.237 
Despite similarities in objectives, the previous administration balanced these policies 
with a larger national strategy revolving around political transformation and 
nonproliferation efforts.238 The specificity of the new security environment was used as 
backdrop for defense planning transformation, but in such transformation, extensive 
cooperation with traditional alliances and the preservation of institutions was heavily 
promoted. Conversely, after the current Bush administration belatedly promoted counter-
proliferation strategies to the core of American foreign policy, a sharp shift in emphasis 
towards military components of counter-proliferation strategies became apparent. The 
prominence of the newly upgraded proactive military undertakings, and the publicly 
announced determination to ignore others’ opinions stirred an intense public debate 
among allies.239  
3. The Bush Doctrine’s Policy Implications  
Many see the unilateralist guidance regarding military planning and particularly 
the utility of  nuclear weapons as a self-fulfilling prophecy, generating a “bellicose global 
atmosphere” that will bring about the worst-case scenario envisaged by military 
planners.240 
As illustrated in the previous chapters, the unilateralists recommend thorough 
planning for engaging in various contingencies as a critical ingredient for a credible 
deterrence policy – i.e., maximum deterrence.241 Hence, in essence, the Bush doctrine 
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speaks to a remarkable endurance of earlier debates about the use of force in the nuclear 
era. Its rationale is rooted in the old “war-fighting” school of thought, which advanced 
flexible response, countervailing and prevailing strategies during the Cold War. As in 
previous circumstances when war-fighting capabilities were brought to the core of 
military planning, the Bush doctrine’s recommendations of military transformation are 
considered to promote an excessively offensive posture.242 
Critics argue that, by integrating nuclear weapons with other military capabilities, 
the Bush Administration’s strategy blurs the boundary between nuclear and conventional 
weapons, legitimating the former as “instruments of state power.”243 The development of 
more accurate conventional weapons capable of accomplishing roles previously 
attributed to nuclear weapons further obscures the distinction between the two levels of 
violence. The consequence foreseen is the increased incentive for America’s enemies to 
acquire WMD in order to equal the U.S.’s advanced technology and as an insurance 
policy against American intervention.244 
Additionally, although the Bush administration repeatedly announced cuts in 
strategic nuclear arms, the discrepancy between the number of dismantled warheads and 
those that become part of the active-reserve stockpile has stirred criticism from Russia.245 
In this context, the lack of a formal, legally binding and verifiable agreement, as well as 
the great emphasis placed on the role of research and development, generates a U.S. 
ability to reconstitute its arsenal rapidly. The overall result has undermined efforts for 
genuine arms reductions and control in a broader venue. Moreover, critics argue that the 
U.S.’s strategic relationship with Russia and China is jeopardized by its multi-tiered  
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missile defense system and the increased precision of its offensive nuclear and 
conventional weapons.246 The predicted outcome of such actions is a global arms race, 
triggered by the unilateralist U.S. nuclear policy.247 
As Frederick W. Kagan indicates, the emphasis placed by the Bush administration 
on military efficiency represents a trade-off to the detriment of the post-conflict 
objectives of nation-building for long-term national and regional stability. Designed 
around the concepts of the “Network-Centric Warfare” (NCW) and “shock and awe,” the 
new approach relies on information superiority to enable more effective neutralization 
and defeat of the enemy by destroying its “ability to command; to provide logistics; to 
organize society.” The deficiency of this approach is illustrated by the difficulties the 
U.S. has encountered in trying to stabilize and rebuild post-conflict Afghanistan and 
Iraq.248  
American officials justify downgrading deterrence due to its inherently 
unpredictable character and partial utility, particularly in the new security setting. They 
argue that while improved intelligence information would provide a more accurate cost-
benefit calculus, there is a limit to the ability to design an entirely reliable strategy. They 
claim that particular values, mode of thought, as well as the idiosyncratic leadership 
beliefs of the opponent are even more difficult to overcome when dealing with non-state 
actors. In their view the current security environment places even more strains on an 
already brittle deterrence, through the unpredictable outcome of the fusion of terrorism, 
rogue states and diffused technology. They recommend thorough preparations for failed 
deterrence due to the possession of WMD and long-range delivery capabilities by hostile 
regional powers and their willingness use them.249  
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However, this argument is not new; it has been constantly used by the proponents 
of the war-fighting school of thought. The First Gulf War also showed that deterrence 
worked in Saddam Hussein’s case. Furthermore, the definition of a successful deterrence 
strategy assumes a mélange of threat and reassurance. Therefore, critics stress the need 
for a balanced policy that includes a wide spectrum of mutually supporting cooperative 
and coercive responses. The long-term advantages of a security policy that exercises self-
restraint include, they argue, reassurance of allies and a  comprehensive, far-sighted 
strategy to present opponents “with a structured choice … [instead of being] pushed into 
a choice.”250  
Furthermore, in analyzing the Bush administration’s decision to pursue non-
proliferation through the use of preemptive force and regime change, Robert S. Litwak 
calls attention to the need to tackle the initial motivations that prompted proliferation in 
order to achieve the long-term non-proliferation aim. He notes that the motivations for 
proliferation are highly context-dependent, springing from domestic and structural 
considerations. Thus, Litwak warns that regime change in itself is not sufficient to secure 
durable non-proliferation results. The critical indicator of proliferation is regime 
intentions, not regime type.251  The Bush doctrine of preemption therefore is not only 
politically controversial due to the undermining effect on the international law, but also 
may well be highly ineffective in the long term.252 
4. The Bush Doctrine’s Prospects of Durability  
Nonetheless, in spite of the controversy surrounding the Bush doctrine, the 
September 2001 attacks on the United States generated the necessary momentum to 
empower the hard-liners’ approach within the American policymaking community. 
Although the current policy is highly contested, certain elements point to a possible 
future durability of the current trends in the American policy.253 Primary among them is 
the accuracy of the Strategy’s description of the threats to U.S. interests. The  
international security environment has changed since the time when President Truman 
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characterized preemptive action as a weapon of fascist dictators. Secondly, the 
unprecedented degree of American power burdens the United States with responsibility 
for international stability, peace and order. These realities give a sense of legitimacy to 
the transformations adopted. Proponents of the current administration praise the new 
American security policy, arguing that the Bush doctrine is the most relevant revolution 
in security since the Truman administration. This revolution finally, in their view, brings 
U.S. security policy and U.S. power to a common denominator – in other words it shapes 
an assertive behavior, in harmony with its unrivaled power.  
Such indications of the durability of the unilateralist trend in American security 
policy are of profound concern to the international community. While the historical 
record illustrates that the United States, as well as other countries, has acted unilaterally 
at times, those situations are expected to be exceptions to the general standard and not the 
norm in official policy.  International concerns were heightened by the missionary vision 
of the Bush administration’s policy, expressed in Secretary of State Colin Powell’s 
presentation to Congress:  
… our main purpose [is] to extend democracy, prosperity, and freedom to 
all the remaining dark corners of the world. Iraq is just a step in this 
process - a process that, as President Bush has said, will establish a 
balance of power that favors freedom across the globe.254 
Regime change through military force appears now to be an overarching goal of 
the Bush administration’s policy. By depicting Iraq as just one step of a broader scheme, 
the Bush administration has deepened anxieties about the American view of the use of 
force not only in the case of Iraq, but also with regards to any number of unforeseen 
events.  
Despite arguments of a permanent shift in U.S. strategic culture, the analysis 
conducted in this thesis suggests that it is implausible that the Bush doctrine will long 
endure, given the prior defeats that similar unilateralist endeavors have suffered 
throughout the history of the United States. 
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Whereas the American political leadership succeeded for decades in synthesizing 
diverging interests and trends into a strategic culture that balanced multilateral and 
unilateral approaches to security, the current “revolution” in security affairs promotes a 
narrow strategic interest defined by an unsteady combination of offensive realism and 
Wilsonian idealism. Such an approach not only dismisses the U.S.’s long-standing 
commitment to the global interest that includes other members of the international 
community, but in doing so, fails to promote U.S. national values abroad.255 This will 
lead to short-term, issue-oriented alliances – or, in the words of the Administration, “the 
mission defines the coalition.” The end result is likely to be the United States’ isolation 
from the international community. However, while this was a feasible option half of 
century ago, in today’s era of globalization isolation is no longer an option.  
Despite the fact that the current administration played up its attempts to bring 
about consensus with its new worldview, its “a la carte multilateralism” assumes a case-
by-case approach, instead of presenting a long-term vision that would assure continuity 
and predictability. The consequence is that established standards of behavior are blurred, 
undermining stability in the international system. The drawback of such an approach is 
increased violence, leading to inevitable U.S. overstretch, and greater costs of unilateral 
system-management, particularly as weakened international institutions will be unable to 
facilitate burden-sharing.256  
More importantly, the durability of President Truman’s “constitutional world 
order” was given by its resilience and thorough awareness of the structure of the 
international system, characterized by the antagonist relations with the Soviet Union.257 
Conversely, the Bush administration’s security policy is uninformed by today’s realities, 
where the transnational character of the major challenges demands multilateral  
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cooperation. In an era of economic and information globalization most of the threats 
cannot be solved in isolation or through a unilateral approach, requiring broad and active 
cooperation.258  
As illustrated in Chapter II the post-Cold War American foreign policy by and 
large followed the multilateral orientation established by the Truman administration, 
bridging diverging tendencies of unilateralism and isolationism under the umbrella of a 
multilateralist worldview. However, with the end of the Cold War the United States’ 
position of the sole super-power liberated the unilateralist camp previous from strategic 
constraints. The advance of the unilateral argument was favored in part by the American 
public’s lack of interest in international issues in the post Cold War era. The perceived 
lack of threat enhanced the isolationist tendency in the American strategic culture, 
opening up room for pressure placed by unilateral interest groups on the American 
international agenda. The cumulative effect was a unilateral approach in foreign 
affairs.259 Nonetheless, it is this author’s conviction that all of the aforementioned factors 
are circumstantial and the likelihood of a lasting influence of the Bush doctrine of 
preemption is unrealistic.  
In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the American response to the September 
2001 terrorist attacks has been sanctioned by the American audience due to an overall 
perception of heightened vulnerability, which awakened specific features of the 
American way of war. The Wilsonian rhetoric adopted by American officials resembled 
to great extent the moralistic approach and crusading spirit specific to the American view 
of war portrayed in Chapter II of this thesis. President George W. Bush’s famous 2002 
State of the Union Address as well as other public statements, stand as evidence of the 
endurance of these features in the American strategic culture. As Lawrence Freedman 
noted, the tragic events brought to life the memory of Pearl Harbor. It stirred panic based 
on “long-established U.S. fears of surprise attacks in the form of a bolt from the skies... 
[which is a] product of geography and history.”260 In addition, the predicament of 
planning a thorough defense in a nuclear era, detailed in Chapter III of this thesis, seems 
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to offer some justification for the Bush administration’s argument. However, polls 
indicate that the American public displays a “strong preference for using military force 
under the auspices of the United Nations,” as opposed to unilateral intervention.261 The 
general unease with unilateralist behavior of the current administration has been 
illustrated by American public’s reaction of to the UNSC members’ decision to veto a 
resolution legitimating military intervention in Iraq.  Hence, a long-term policy in 
unilateralist terms is unlikely to be perceived as legitimate by the American public in 
addition to being unsuited to the interdependent nature of the current international 
system.  
Notwithstanding the circumstantial factors that generated it, the Bush doctrine 
ignores the lesson learned from previous decades that substantiated the shortsightedness 
and ineffectiveness of unbridled unilateralism and its emphasis on autonomy of action 
and ad-hoc management of problems. This is an insight which shaped the American 
strategic culture along the lines of multilateralism ever since President Truman. The 
subsequent administrations aimed at maintaining multilateral institutions that enshrined 
the United States’ values. In doing so, they strived to serve the U.S. interests by 
socializing the other states, and provide incentives for them to follow its lead. This 
approach was seen as the best means to ensure continued hegemonic dominance as well 
as international stability in a cost-effective manner.  
The achievements of the multilateral approach speak for its value. Throughout the 
Cold War, the binding commitments and interdependence helped balance unilateral 
impulses with long term interests, and thus, preserve stability in the system. Furthermore, 
as Chapter III of this thesis indicates, the replacement of the “war-fighting” strategies 
with a focus on stability and political transformation, achieved through cooperative 
policies, played a great role in bringing about the end of the Cold War. As predicted by 
George Kennan, it was the cohesiveness of the Trans-Atlantic alliance, maintained 
through common values and a focus on cooperative policies that produced a political 
transformation in the Soviet Union short of war. President Clinton furthered the logic of  
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multilateral security and economic institutions by establishing the Partnership for Peace 
program and pursuing multilateral resolution of threats to international stability and U.S. 
security. 
Moreover, aside from the intended benefits, the achievement of the binding and 
interdependent relations envisaged more than a half of century ago by the Western 
democracies resulted also in the rise of global threats such as terrorism and hostile non-
state actors. The increased globalization and interdependence among states presents 
challenges today that are inherently transnational and cannot be met unilaterally as they 
are by definition multilateral problems. Consequently, multilateral cooperation is 
mandatory for the successful tackling of today’s transnational threats.  
As Joseph S. Nye Jr. noted, even states as militarily powerful as the United States 
are unable to secure their interests unilaterally in the long term: 
… in this global information age, number one ain’t gonna be what it used 
to be. To succeed in such a world, America must not only maintain its 
hard power but understand its soft power and how to combine the two in 
the pursuit of national and global interests.262 
Hence, despite the increased prominence of the hard-line approach in American 
foreign and security policy, the likelihood of a lasting influence of the Bush doctrine of 
preemption is unrealistic. The discrepancies between the initial American claim with 
regards to Iraq’s possession of WMD and the post-conflict findings further discredited 
the Bush doctrine. 
In sum, based on the analysis conducted, this thesis concludes that the constraints 
on the Bush doctrine’s endurance are embedded particularly in its inconsistency with the 
American strategic culture in the modern history. Throughout the last half of century, the 
United States projected the national values abroad, shaping the system of interaction in 
the international relations arena based on specificities of the traditional American 
strategic culture, rooted in the multilateral creed. The end result is that the international 
system comprises built-in constraints that raise the cost of isolationist and unilateralist 
impulses to unbearable levels in the long term.  
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This conclusion has been confirmed by the U.S. experience of the difficulty of 
regime change in Iraq. This might be the ingredient that will help bring about a greater 
awareness of the Bush doctrine’s flaws. Furthermore, the constraints on a continuous 
hard-line approach are illustrated by evolutions of the Bush administration’s approach in 
the aftermath of the 2003 U.S.-led intervention in Iraq. The U.S. policy toward North 
Korea and Iran brought into focus the necessity of alternative strategies as deterrence and 
reassurance. Hence, further efforts to reach a proper balance between non-violent 
coercive measures and the use of force should offer a constructive basis for further 
adjustments.263  
Altogether, the debate over the Bush doctrine of preemption and its application in 
Iraq indisputably placed the United States and its traditional allies in conflict. However, 
despite the current perception of the collapse of traditional alliances, historical examples 
illustrate that most attempts to revolutionize the international system have been 
characterized by a perception of crisis. The Bush administration’s desire to amend the 
current mechanisms to cope with the security environment has been shared by most U.S. 
allies, and steps have been taken in this direction.264 Furthermore, UN Secretary General 
Kofi A. Annan’s decision to redefine legitimate circumstances of UN-sanctioned military 
intervention to include “protection against international terrorism and [the] halt [of] the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction,”265 reveals prospects for propitious future 
cooperation. Overall, if proper lessons are learned from this experience, the revitalization 
of the international institutions as necessary participants in the management of current 
security threats could be achieved on one hand, while on the other American hard-liners 
would be reminded of the benefits of such institutionalized multilateral cooperation.266  
Although the dispute over Iraq has been considered as jeopardizing the UN and 
critically undermining the international laws governing the use of force, the UN remains 
the single international body that commands a high degree of international legitimacy, 
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despite its deficiencies.267 The fact that the United States relied its pre-war justifications 
for its military intervention on previous UNSC resolutions amounts to clear recognition 
that, while not perfect, the UN is the best instrument for pursuing international order, 
which still remains an central interest in the twenty-first century.268 
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